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ABSTRACT: This article starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to 
network industries. Some new developments (which focus on the role of inter-jurisdictional 
externalities and multiple objectives) are then added and used to analyze regulatory arrangements in 
telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. Although central or federal policy making is 
more focused and specialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not 
clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When 
technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for 
organizing the institutional architecture of regulation expand. 
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RESUMEN: Este artículo comienza por resumir la investigación sobre federalismo económico y 
relacionarla con las industrias de red. Algunos nuevos desarrollos (centrados en el rol de las 
externalidades inter-jurisdiccionales y la multiplicidad de objetivos) son a continuación añadidos y 
utilizados para analizar la regulación de la energía y las telecomunicaciones en Estados Unidos y la 
Unión Europea. Aunque la regulación central o federal es más focalizada y especializada y dificulta 
más la organización de los grupos de interés, no está claro de forma incondicional que los poderes 
centrales no vayan asociados a niveles demasiado bajos de inversión. Cuando la tecnología 
posibilita la introducción de competencia en algunos segmentos, las posibilidades de organizar la 
arquitectura institucional de la regulación se expanden. 
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1 Introduction
The allocation of regulatory tasks in network industries across the vertical struc-
ture of government has become a salient issue both in Europe and the US in
the recent past. In the European Union, the new regulatory packages that are
being debated include the creation of some form of pan-European telecommu-
nications and energy regulators. At the same time, jurisdictional conicts have
intensied, such as in the regulatory holidays for next generation broadband
discussion between Germany and the European Commission, or the jurisdic-
tional controversy about the conditions for the failed takeover of Endesa by
E-On between Spain and the European Commission. In the United States, the
1996 Telecommunications Act and technological developments such as the ex-
pansion of Internet and wireless telephony have blurred the distinction between
interstate and intrastate issues, and (to use the words of a recent overview of
US telecommunications1) have marked the transition between an era of dual
("bright lines") federalism (where there was a clear distinction between the role
of the states and the role of the FCC, the federal regulatory agency) to a more
complex era of cooperative federalism (where the states and the FCC are jointly
responsible for a number of tasks). In electricity, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission tries to promote the creation of Regional Transmission Organiza-
tions that preside over the expansion of wholesale markets and coordinate the
transmission of electricity over these markets, and more often than not the states
resist such process. Additionally, federal and state agencies have overlapping or
concurrent jurisdiction in energy merger cases; state agencies often invoke ill-
dened "public interest" objectives that give them discretion to stop potentially
e¢ ciency-enhancing mergers (Wolak, 2007).
There is a well documented historical trend by which the regulation of util-
ities has moved up in the vertical chain of government, starting at the begining
of the XXth century from the local to the state level in the US2 and other ju-
risdictions.3 However, in the US the bulk of regulation is still performed at the
state level and has not moved much further up to the federal level, although
the federal regulatory agencies created in the New Deal era have played an in-
creasing role rst regulating interstate issues and in the recent past promoting
and actively overseeing liberalization. Meanwhile, signicant intervention still
persists at the local level, as illustrated by the role of municipal ownership of
distribution utilities in the US (more than 100 US cities have a municipal util-
ity) or Norway, or in the initiatives of local powers to promote broadband access
to the Internet in many localities. Decentralized powers are under signicant
pressure to intervene in regulated network industries, at least for three reasons
(see Troesken, 1996):
(i) the physical deployment of networks depends on the rights of way for
1Nuechterlein and Weiser (2006).
2See Troesken (1996).
3Although in most other jurisdictions, the move to the national-state level involved the
creation of state owned (moslty, although not universally, especially in electricity) national
vertically integrated rms.
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which local powers are often naturally responsible;
(ii) regulatory policies are locally salient, and
(iii) interest groups nd it relatively easy at the local level to organize to
inuence these policies in a variety of directions.
If local powers were responsible for most of these policies (for example, for
setting regulated tari¤s) they would face the typical commitment problem in the
presence of sunk investments (see for example Levine et al., 2005 and references
therein). For a number of reasons that will be explained in Section 3, local
powers have a number of objectives when deciding to intervene in regulated
industries. Central policies tend to be more focused than local policies, in the
sense that they are subject to the inuence of a lower number of interest groups
and can a¤ord to incur the costs of regulatory specialization, but may create
too much homogeneity, and they are also subject to commitment issues. A key
question then is how to organize regulation taking into account the constraints
faced at each level of government.
Liberalization processes in the US and the EU add a further layer of com-
plexity relative to monopoly regulation. As some authors have characterized
the liberalization process in network industries as a "long and winding road,"4
no minor ingredient of such conditions is the relationship between the di¤erent
government levels. If anything, the introduction of competition increases insti-
tutional diversity (see Moore, 2002), for example in electricity by introducing
the role of system and market operators (which can be integrated in the same
organization or not, and this organization can be integrated with a transmission
company or not). Although the federal levels at both the US and the EU have
promoted liberalization of competitive segments in di¤erent forms, there has
been more variation in the extent to which US states or EU member-states have
embraced the liberalization of electricity or telecommunications.
There are common trends and di¤erences between the US and Europes fed-
eralism experience in network industries that are worth exploring, as it is done
in Section 4 below. Existing di¤erences between the US and Europe may be due
not so much to doctrine but to di¤erences in underlying institutions (eg more
sovereignty in European member states, larger role for the Courts in the US,
more exible markets in the US: see Kovacic, 2007, in the context of anti-trust).
Aubert and La¤ont (2002) argue that technology considerations and inherited
institutions5 determine the location of regulatory decisions. This echoes the
notion due to Spiller and his co-authors6 that the institutional endowment con-
strains the policies and decisions of specic regulators. The role of inertia in
this eld may be due to the fact that to select the set of policies that pertain to
central government a higher degree of consensus is needed than to make choices
4Armstrong and Sappington (2006).
5 Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) argue that the right degree of decentralization should have as
objective not only economic e¢ ciency, but also other objectives such as political participation
or the representation of minorities. Aubert and La¤ont (2002, p. 12): "Once an entity began
to regulate an industry, the regulatory structure was slow to change. This is because regulation
entails the power to create and distribute rents, and political and administrative bodies are
reluctant to relinquish such power."
6See for example Spiller and Tommasi (2007).
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within the selected group of policies. For example, in the EU unanimity between
member states is usually required to introduce institutional changes. And the
subsidiarity principle in the EU establishes that the burden of the proof is on
central levels; in case of doubt, decentralization prevails.
The organization of government may not always coincide with market bound-
aries or with the boundaries of rms. As Woroch (1990) argues, "when multiple
regulators are unavoidable, boundaries between them should divide areas and
services that exhibit low cross-elasticities of demand and supply. Such "bright
lines" have become less attainable with recent developments in telephony." And
"how governments divide up the industrial landscape may be vastly di¤erent
from how business choose to organize."
In some aspects of the economic analysis of regulatory institutions, some-
times regulation has been compared to monetary policy. For example, it has
been suggested that the rationale for regulatory independence is similar (al-
though not identical) to the rationale for Central Bank independence (see Levine
et al., 2005). It would thus be tempting to suggest that both in the US and
the EU the solution for the jurisdictional allocation of regulation should imitate
the solution for monetary policy: allocate it to a federal agency. However, the
jurisdictional allocation problem in regulation is vastly complicated by the verti-
cal industrial structure of network industries, where di¤erent industry segments
could operate at di¤erent optimal geographical sizes.
The relationship between regulation and investment is another key aspect
of the debate. For example some commentators argue that too much regula-
tory diversity discourages investment because it introduces costs related to red
tape and uncertainty.7 But others (such as Weingast and his co-authors in
their theory of market preserving federalism reviewed in Section 2) argue that
decentralization introduces a variety of veto points which stop the predatory
tendencies associated to Leviathan and restricts the information and author-
ity available to central powers, thereby contributing to reinforce commitment
(not to expropriate investments). But decentralization as an attempt to reduce
the role of state intervention (as advocated in the Reagan8 era) may have the
problem of reducing the scope for good as well as for bad policies: as it is
well known in the literature on reform in developing countries, the further veto
points contributed by decentralization favor the status quo: this may be good
if the status quo implies preserving the value of investments, but it may be bad
if the status quo implies stopping a potentially welfare increasing market ex-
pansion or liberalization process. Both the new political economy of federalism
and the experience of US electricity suggest that decentralization (at the state
or member state level) is better at providing commitment for investment than
at accommodating deregulation market reforms.
7On the costs of overlapping or duplicated regulation, see mentions to it by Kovacic (2007)
and Spector (2007).
8Reagan launched his political career with a speech defending states rights in a location
related to the movement for civil rights, according to Krugman (2007). This connected with a
tradition, mentioned also by Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999), of using states rights as a way
to defend state policies of racial discrimination.
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There are not many academic contributions in economics to the federalism
debate in the eld of the regulation of network industries9 (although there are
generic references to "regulation" in the federalism literature, such as in Oates,
1999 and Easterbrook, 1978), as compared to the literature on scal federalism
or environmental policy. There are some informal discussions (Smith, 2000;
Brennan, 2003; Seabright, 1998), some empirical work (Humplick and Estache,
1995), a few very general theoretical models that can be applied to any industry
or policy (Seabright, 1996; Caillaud et al., 1996), and very few models applied to
network industries (La¤ont and Pouyet, 1994; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006;
Woroch, 1990; and Lehman and Weismann, 2000).
Existing theories or empirical work on economic federalism, which are re-
viewed in the next Section, do not allow for a general conclusion in favour of
a clear assignment of centralized or decentralized regulation, and the solutions
may be country or sector specic. However, decisions on jurisdictional alloca-
tion of regulatory responsibilities are a matter of discussion both in the EU and
in the US, and they would benet from old and new considerations on economic
federalism.
As an example, the National Regulatory Research Institute (NRRI)10 in the
US suggests federalism principles that might underlie a potential new federal
Telecommunications Act in the US. These may include:
a. State participation is desirable whenever a sound regulatory decision
requires knowledge of local conditions, such as the locations for areas not served
by rural broadband.
b. State participation is desirable when controversies are so numerous or
time consuming as to be beyond the resources of the FCC. State commissions
have, in the aggregate, far more fact-nding resources than the FCC.
c. State nancial participation is desirable whenever it would advance a
costly federal objective. For example, the courts and the Universal Service
Joint Board have recognized the advantages of a state-federal partnership in
universal service.
d. State enforcement of existing federal or state standards is desirable when-
ever it produces better results for retail or wholesale consumers. States are often
the rst point of contact for consumer complaints, and states ordinarily o¤er
quicker and more e¤ective responses to consumer complaints.
e. States are better able to respond to new problems where a single na-
tional policy would be premature. Early state actions regarding slamming and
telephone number pooling, for example, guided subsequent FCC policies.
"Laboratory federalism" in case of uncertainty is one of the most convincing
arguments11 in favour of decentralization in network industries such as telecom-
munications and electricity where even expert economists disagree on what the
exact attributes of reform should be. Joskow (2006) argues as follows on the
9There are interesting contributions to federalism in network industries from historians
(Troesken, 1996), legal scholars (Weiser, 2001 and 2003) and political scientists (Teske, 2004).
10This is the research arm of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC). See http://nrri.org.
11Some caveats will be explained in Section 2 and the conclusions.
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comparison between California and other states in electricity: "Interestingly, the
New England states, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania had implemented
very similar reforms at about the same time and experienced some of the same
exogenous shocks to demand and fuel prices in 2000 and 2001. Yet they did not
experience the same system meltdown as did California. So, there is something
to learn as well comparing some of the more detailed aspects of the reforms in
California with those in these other US states." However Joskow doubts that
the right lessons have been learned from California, probably suggesting that
the crisis was seen as an indictment of liberalization instead of as a guide to
which mistakes should be avoided when restructuring electricity.
This article explores rst to what extent the existing literature on economic
(mainly scal) federalism is applicable to network industries. The conclusion
of this exploration, presented at the end of the literature review in Section 2,
is that many of these insights can be readily applied to these industries, but
that some additions to the existing theory may shed further light on this ju-
risdictional allocation problem. The rst of these additions is related to the
conicts of policies (for example between "industrial policy" and the control of
market power) that pervade decision-making especially in decentralized admin-
istrations. There is then an attempt to sketch a basic model in Section 3 that
captures this additional insight. The second addition concerns the relationship
between central and local powers in developing structure regulation (in addi-
tion to behavioral regulation). In network industries, it is common that di¤erent
levels of government have responsibilities in structural or behavioral regulation
over di¤erent phases of the value chain. Three cases are studied in Section
4: in telecommunications, non-cooperative interaction between regulators and
cooperative interaction; and in electricity overlapping responsibilities. Also in
Section 4, some historical and empirical evidence is presented on the impact
of jurisdiction allocation in both industries. Section 5 concludes and discusses
limitations and ideas for future research.
2 Literature Review: What Are The Main Ar-
guments and How Are They Related to Net-
work Industries
The theoretical and empirical literature on economic federalism provides few
clear cut prescriptions as to the appropriate jurisdictional location of regula-
tory decisions, although it contributes a variety of insights that may be useful
in specic settings. In general, centralization performs better when there are
jurisdictional spillovers and when there are coordination issues and product and
"policy" economies of scale. Centralized decision making does not necessarily
imply uniform decision making (as in electricity in the UK -except Northern
Ireland), so in theory it can deal with heterogeneity, which in the absence of
di¤erentiated central policies would favour decentralization. Decentralization is
also favoured when knowledge of local demand or cost (including political trans-
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action costs) conditions is important. Moreover, the type of decentralization is
often crucial in the arguments. Not surprisingly, the empirical evidence nds
little overall signicant evidence of decentralization dominating centralization
or vice versa. Further details on the literature are given below, but the focus
here is on how the arguments a¤ect the regulation and other public policies
related to network industries. The discussion is organized by starting with the
traditional, "rst generation" scal federalism studies, and next analyzing issues
addressed by "second generation" studies, concerned by agency (informational
assymetries and accountability) and capture issues. The Section proceeds by
discussing some empirical evidence, and providing some concluding thoughts
about the literature review.
To consider how the existing literature on federalism12 a¤ects the regulation
of network industries, it may be useful to keep in mind some characteristics of
these industries:
-The basic technology of these industries presents sunk costs, scale economies,
and naturally monopolistic segments.
-The services produced by network industries are universally consumed and
are complementary of production and private consumption.
-Vertical relations among di¤erent industry segments are a key issue, espe-
cially if (necessarily imperfect) competition is introduced in some of them.
-Public intervention is made di¢ cult by asymmetric information between
rms and regulators, lobbying, commitment problems and technological com-
plexity.
First generation scal federalism: regulatory competition, hetero-
geneity, scale and laboratory federalism
"Laboratory federalism" is the concept used to portray the situation where a
number of decentralized jurisdictions experience with di¤erent options to solve
the same problem in the face of uncertainty, so that all the decentralized units
can learn, in an idea originally attributed to Justice Brandeis13 of the US
Supreme Court. To some extent, this is what has happened with regulatory
reform in the recent past: some jurisdictions have learned from othersexpe-
riences. For example, the California crisis in 2000 has inuenced subsequent
developments in US electricity, or the functional separation of the incumbents
wireline telecommunications broadband network in the UK has been taken as
an example by the European Commission to promote a similar model in the
rest of the EU. In a decentralized state where jurisdictions spontaneously en-
gage in innovation, there will be too few innovations because of the public good
nature of uncertainty reducing information.14 Of course, the federal level and
12For excellent surveys of the general literature on federalism, see Oates (1999) and Treisman
(2007). Several denitions of federalism are provided by Riker (1964), Rubinfeld (1997), and
Treisman (2007).
13Although Justice Brandeis of the US Supreme Court is usually credited with coming up
with the idea of laboratory federalism in the 1930s, Oates (1999) cites Lord James Bryce as
an earlier reference in 1888.
14Treisman (2007) argues that the degree of innovation contributed by the decentralized
units will be lower than optimal because they pay the full costs of the innovative activities
and will only reap part of the benets. It would be better then to centrally organize the
6
the states can derive the wrong lessons from experiments: the interested parties
will highlight those elements of the experiences that best suit their interests.
As in any decicion making public policy process, the outcome will depend on a
number of political economy dimensions.
Competition between states to attract mobile factors may select good poli-
cies in equilibrium under some conditions; for example, competition between
jurisdictions becomes less e¤ective as the size of the legislating jurisdiction in-
creases.15 The classical Tiebout (1959) model of scal competition is a revela-
tion mechanism exercise where citizens reveal their preferences for local public
goods by moving around localities that o¤er di¤erent combinations of taxation
and public goods. Easterbrook (1983) translates the argument to general regu-
latory policies and argues that imposing the pre-eminence of federal anti-trust
law on the statesregulatory decisions tends to constrain excessively the states
discretion, so that the nal result is too intrusive regulation. Such intrusive
regulation protects cartels in a way that makes them more sustainable than
without the presence of regulatory action. By leaving more discretion to states
so that other forms of regulatory action may be contemplated (including dereg-
ulation or competition for the market), regulatory competition may preserve
the conditions that make the Tiebout model empirically plausible as long as
spillovers are absent or of small magnitude, among which: existence of many
possible regulatory alternatives; existence of many possible jurisdictions; mobil-
ity. Local, municipal regulation increases the benets of regulatory competition
because the jurisdictions are really many and mobility is higher than between
states. Easterbrook concludes that "One need not think of states as labora-
tories, as Justice Brandeis did, to know that the pressures of exit and voice
cause governments to search for laws that strike an adequate balance between
favors to interest groups and benets to other residents. The greatest threat to
consumerswelfare is not states, and their competition, but a uniform national
regimen that sties the power of exit -that is, a monopoly of lawmaking." How-
ever, conditions are strong and Spector (2007) cites negative recent empirical
results for the states competition theory based on the Tiebout model.
In most network industries, capital is xed and sunk and therefore immo-
bile. Hence the argument that capital mobility induces good regulatory policies
cannot be made in the sense that the regulated industriescapital will not move
as a result of bad policies. But in theory it can still be made in the indirect
sense that other business (not in the regulated sector, but who use an input
from a regulated industry) and individuals can move as a result of an environ-
ment of bad performance of the regulated sector caused by ine¢ cient regulation.
Inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile capital may however only favour ini-
tially rich regions if the initial heterogeneity is too high (see Treisman, 2007).
If capital is more mobile than labour, and competiton for capital takes place at
localized experiments.
15Casual empiricism reveals that it is precisely in large countries where sub-central units
are large (US, Canada, Australia, Argentina, India) that regulation is decentralized (see also
Beato and La¤ont, 2002). This suggests that the jurisdictional competition rationale has not
played an important role in the evolution of regulation in these countries.
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least in part through low taxes, this may go to the detriment of services toward
less mobile factors ("race to the bottom"), and if it is accompanied by lower
regulatory standards in elds with negative externalities, it may unleash again
a race to the bottom in the form of "beggar thy neighbour" policies. In regu-
lation, as argued by Woroch (1990) for US telecommunications, "in their desire
to attract new businesses and new citizens, regulators will comptete with one
another in terms of their policies. States could impose high access charges for
interstate calls terminating in their state while showing favour to outgoing calls
or intrastate tra¢ c. This tendency could lead to beggar-thy-neighbor policies
which can evolve into ine¢ cient outcomes for all jurisdictions."
In vertical competition models (Treisman, 2007, ch. 6), di¤erent govern-
ment layers taxing the same base yields "overgrazing": too high taxation and
lower output than under one tax (in a similar argument to double marginaliza-
tion in Industrial Organization). Equivalently, two tiers providing complemen-
tary infrastructure investments may provide too little if they do not cooperate.
However, cooperation is di¢ cult to enforce in all relevant dimensions, and if
it is achieved in one dimension but not in others, cheating may go in the non-
cooperative dimensions. Under lack of cooperation, increasing the revenues that
accrue to the local powers may decrease its appettite for expropriation, but in-
crease the predatory instincts of the central layer.
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a,b) and Oates (1999, 2006) note that the condi-
tions of the Tiebout model are not necessary for decentralization being superior
to centralization. In his Decentralization Theorem, Oates establishes that if the
benets of accounting for heterogeneity outweigh the problems created by ju-
risdictional externalities and lack of scale, decentralization is a superior option.
The optimal scale must take into account the costs of providing the service, the
administrative costs of regulation and the communication costs between all the
agents involved (see Treisman, 2007). The xed administrative costs of regula-
tion make it more likely that specialized regulatory functions will be developed
the larger the population involved (see Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005). It can be
argued that to achieve policy di¤erentiation and taylor the size of projects to
total costs and benets, political decentralization is not needed, and local units
of a central state can provide the local projects absent communication prob-
lems. However, even in the absence of these problems, political decentralization
(locally chosen decision units) may act as a commitment device for the robust-
ness of decentralization, as argued by Inman (2008). Treisman (2006) nds that
poltical federalism is positively correlated with the proportion of decentralized
over total country revenues or expenditures.
Oates (2002) distinguishes three di¤erent settings in environmental regula-
tion that call for di¤erent organizations in the vertical structure of government:
-Pure public goods, where the impact on any jurisdiction depends on the
sum of local productions; examples being global warming, research.
-Local public goods with no spillovers, where the impact on any jurisdiction
depends on local production; the clearest example being garbage collection.
-Local public goods with spillovers, where public goods in one jurisdiction
have some e¤ect on neighbouring jurisdictions, the clearest example being en-
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vironmental policies.
Pure public goods call for central responsibilities (although political feasibil-
ity and local information may make necessary some decentralized intervention,
as in the European Trading System of polluting permits); local public goods call
for decentralized intervention (although with capital mobility, if the "race to the
bottom" is a reality, then uniform standards, which may be better established
with some sort of central intervention, may be necessary; however, there is no
race to the bottom under some circumstances, such as no constraints on the
existence of instruments). In all these three cases, global uncertainty may make
the exibility of laboratory federalism valuable ("the states as a laboratory of
democracy").
Klevorick (1996) includes competition policy as example of the sort of stan-
dards that some claim that may be necessary to establish uniformly if the race
to the botom occurs. The author however claims that the arguments both for
the existence of such race and, even if it exists, the necessity of uniform stan-
dards, are not overwhelmingly convincing. In regulated industries, there is a
potential role for centralized, even international powers in the setting of techni-
cal standards (see Gruber, 2004, on cellular telephony). A popular application
of the "common standards" rationale is the argument that too many policies
increase costs and uncertainty, thwarting investment.
Even when common policies that internalize spillovers are preferable, local
units may cooperate on policies that maximize their joint payo¤, without the
need for a central power. Coasian cooperation of sub-central jurisdictions (mak-
ing central jurisdictions unnecessary) is however possible only in very specic
circumstances, as argued by Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a). Special districts in
the sense of Frey and his co-authors can be interpreted as a version of Coasian
cooperation, where specic agencies of di¤erent (optimal) sizes to deal with indi-
vidual services are proposed, as opposed to all purpose institutions.16 The scale
and specialization advantages of such institutions should be weighed against
the problems related to the duplication of xed costs, the interdependencies be-
tween di¤erent policies and the di¢ culties and costs of sustaining cooperation.
Another meaning that has been given to cooperative federalism17 is the need to
play complementary roles between the central and the local levels, for example
the central level deciding on criteria or objectives and the local level being del-
egated the task of implementing the central guidelines and lling in the voids
when the central prescriptions leave some issues open.
Second generation studies: Information, commitment and trans-
action costs
Arguments related to information can also go either way, depending on the
16See Eichenberger and Frey (2006) and Casella and Frey (1992). Examples of special
districts of di¤erent sizes include citizen communities in Swiss cantons to manage electricity
distribution; metropolitan transport authorities; organizations in Spain to manage water use
and irrigation; regional electricity transmission organizations combined with wholesale power
markets such as PJM in the U.S.; or large international organizations to deal with specic
issues such as NATO.
17See Nuechterlein and Weiser (2006).
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type of information. Economies of scale in expertise favor central policy allo-
cation, but proximity to local conditions coupled to communication costs favor
decentralized policy making. Exchange of information may be useful for pur-
poses of yardstick competition, eg across disjoint similar jurisdictions in charge
of regulating electricity distribution. Or there may be huge product market
externalities as in electricity transmission which justify centralized regulation
but still the informational (and political, for example to overcome resistance to
investments) input of the local level be useful. The central regulator transfer-
ring his better information (due to scale economies in expertise) to the local
ones, or the other way around (due to proximity lo local conditions) emerge
a priori as sound cooperation strategies. There may be no externalities in the
product market but still there may be informational externalities, as in the Laf-
font and Pouyet (2004)18 model. Location of expertise and good information
are key issues in modern regulation, both in the practice and the theory of it.
Aubert and La¤ont argue that (p. 20): "...This type of thinking favors decen-
tralization when local information is good and explains the trend toward local
decisionmaking for managing natural resources, such as water and forests. On
the other hand, for health and specic environmental issues, local information
may be weaker than that of the central government, which has better access to
international information." In the US and the EU, the sta¤ and other resources
of state or member state commissions vary widely, and in general it is very
doubtful that that they can perform analyses of the same caliber as the federal
agencies.
Analogies can and have been made between federalism and the role of decen-
tralization in the theory of the rm and the market (see Hayek, 1948) and trends
in rm models in the real world. Bigness at the central level introduces costs
of planning in a similar way that there are costs of managing large companies
(see Mookherjee, 2006). However, decentralization may ine¢ ciently duplicate
some xed costs of regulation. Better information at the local level may allow
for better design of incentive mechanisms at this level (see Tommasi and Weis-
chelbaum, 2007). Oates (1999, p.1137) argues that "the vertical structure of
government may have important implications for the way in which the public
sector functions and its impact on the operation of a system of markets." De-
centralization can be a way to delegate and avoid overload, as it was argued for
example in the reform of European merger policy. Caillaud et al. (1996) present
an interesting model where there is delegation, but still the central powers inu-
ence the bargaining relationship of better informed local regulators with rms
by using transfers.
The analogy with the theory of the rm is also used by the proponents
(Weingast and his co-authors) of "market preserving federalism": a commit-
ment not to concentrate authority and information may play a similar role as
commiting not to fall in a ratchet e¤ect in agency theory. Proponents of "mar-
ket preserving federalism"19 argue (in a rather informal way) that under some
18This paper presents a brief, but useful, review of contract theory models related to de-
centralization issues. See references in La¤ont and Pouyet (2004).
19Rose-Ackerman (1997) and Rubinfeld (1997) place this theory in the framework of the
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conditions (decentralized "primary" regulatory responsibility; a single market
for the whole federation; centralized monetary policy and absence of central
bail-outs) a decentralized system preserves the growth of a market economy.
As the Tiebout model, this theory is also based on the idea that local jurisdic-
tions compete to attract mobile factors in an integrated and open market, but
it adds to the static Tiebout model concerned with allocative e¢ ciency, a focus
on investment, economic growth and commitment, i.e., a dynamic component,
and it includes the possibility that governments at any level are not benevolent
but rent-seeking. Interestingly, the market preserving federalism theory, which
has apparently emerged from a comparison between centralized and stagnant
Russia with decentralized and booming China,20 has in common to the "race to
the bottom" theory that decentralization is associated to a small government,
although each theory seems to attach a rather di¤erent value judgement to such
smallness. In either case, though, the empirical evidence that would support
the association between decentralization and small government is not conclu-
sive. Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997) argue that the conditions stated by
Weingast and his co-authors, which certainly would make federalism preserve
markets, are very unlikely to be self-enforcing or even mutually compatible; for
example, it is di¢ cult that decentralization would avoid exacerbating inequali-
ties, compromising the political sustainability of the compact, and it is di¢ cult
that a central state without relevant economic policy levers would be able to
police a common market and avoid local protectionism.
More information is not always benecial in dynamic settings, absent regula-
tory commitment. Qian and Weingast (1997) argue that reducing the informa-
tion available to central powers reduces the temptation they have to expropriate
investments. But Spector (2007) suggests that in some cases (indirect taxation
in the EU) the local (national) powers may prefer to strategically delegate to
central powers to avoid political criticism. For example, in the relationship
between decentralization and macroeconomic management or reform, federalist
structures create veto points that provide committment, but also stall welfare-
enhancing reforms (Rodden and Wibels, 2002). The order of reforms should
then be: rst reform at the national level, then decentralize to provide commit-
ment (Treisman 1999).
Troesken (1996),21 in a detailed account of the history of the gas industry
regulation in the city of Chicago (with some references also to the history of
other US cities), argues that the move from local franchises to state regulation,
which took place in the US under lobbying by regulated rms in the rst decades
of the XX Century, was rooted in the inability of local politicians to commit
not to expropriate sunk investments. Local franchises evolved into a system of
politicized and arbitrary local regulation after technological change triggered by
the use of water gas caused the entry of new rms in the gas industry and a
subsequent process of deregulated consolidation.
New Institutional Economics.
20And also from the history of the US and England in the times of the Industrial Revolution,
which seemed to have a more decentralized structure than today.
21 I thank Pablo Spiller for calling my attention for this important reference.
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State institutions would be more able to commit22 than local institutions
because the ability of consumers to organize and exert political pressure ex post
at the state level is relatively lower. Three reasons are given for this:
-Under state regulation, utility rates were decided by appointed commis-
sions, whereas under local regulation they were decided mostly directly by the
City Council (occasionally, experts were called, but their advise was not always
heeded). Thus, under state regulation an additional systematic layer was created
between consumers and decision makers, making more di¢ cult the monitoring
e¤orts of consumers.
-From a geographic point of view, consumers were fewer and more concen-
trated under local regulation,23 which lowered the transaction costs of organizing
as a lobby.
-Utility rates were a more salient issue at the local level than at the state
level, where they had to compete for attention with many other issues. In local
politics, as in the detailed account of local elections at the beginning of the
XX Century in Chicago by Troesken (1996), reducing gas rates was an easy to
understand topic, which was followed by the local media and used by career
politicians to win votes.
These arguments are supported by event studies of the main legislative or
municipal decisions, showing that the rms reacted negatively to events related
to the a¢ rmation of local authority and positively to events related to the af-
rmation of state authority. And also by a probit analysis of the votes of state
legislators, showing that representatives of regions where gas was not deployed
favored state regulation as a mechanism to commit not to expropriate the in-
vestments that were still needed (as opposed to representatives from regions
where investments had already been deployed).
Troesken (1996, p. 89) reports that the vice president of the Pacic Gas and
Electric Company argued that under municipal regulation, corporations were
"at the mercy of as pitiless a pack of howling destroyers, as would the lonely
traveller on the Sibberian steppes be against the gaunt and hungry wolves."
The company vice president advocated state regulation, in part, because state
commissions would set rates in "calm deliberation and not in political heat."
The longevity of state regulation after its inception at the beginning of the
XXth century would be evidence of this ability to commit. Jarrell (1978) ar-
gues that the move to state regulation from local franchises favoured regulated
rms, because under local franchises the rms were constrained to competitive
conditions due to a context similar to the one envisaged by Demsetz (1968) in
his characterization of bidding for the monopolized eld. Priest (1992) also
22The higher prots of rms under state regulation than rms without state regulation
found by Stigler and Friedland (1962) would then be evidence of state regulation yielding
higher prots than local regulation, but not higher prots than deregulation.
23 It may be useful to compare the transaction costs of organizing utility consumers to the
transaction costs of organizing the consumers of imported commodities, which are numerous
and geographically dispersed (whereas producers are ususally few and concentraded). Notice
also that in modern regulated corporations, the managers are fewer and more concentrated
than the dispersed owners, raising the potential for the operation of an autonomous lobby: the
managers of regulated corporations themselves (see Trillas, 2004, and Bel and Trillas, 2005).
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describes the transition from local franchises to state commission regulation,
pointing out that the di¤erence was mainly in the location rather than in the
nature of regulation, since local franchises evolved over time to become admin-
istered contracts with some sort of regulatory intervention (interestingly, often
through occasional delegation by local councils into "independent" or "expert"
arbitrators or commissions as mentioned above). He also argues that the Dem-
setz model is not consistent with the context of local utility franchises because
the local powers in the mid to late XIX Century did not own the infrastructure
(which when the rst franchises were allocated was basically non-existent) and
did not have the ability to prevent entry. Then local franchises were equivalent
to long term incomplete contracts between a party that contributed the rights
of way on city streets, and a party that contributed expertise and sunk assets.
Troesken (1996) also insists on some elements of continuity: utilities under local
regulation were protected by constitutional constraints and state legislation, and
actually some of the decisions by local regulators were overruled by the courts.
Additionally, local authorities for example in Chicago did not stop mobilizing
to go back to a system of local regulation after the establishment of state regu-
lation. State regulation was however prefered to local regulation by producers
(although their rst best woud have been deregulation) and state regulation
was prefered to deregulation by consumers and local politicians (although their
rst best would have been local regulation). Teske (2004) associates both a
strengthening of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the develop-
ment of strong state regulators to the strength of the Progressive movement
in the US at the beginning of the XX century. Forty-ve states established
the Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) that still exist today between 1907 and
1922: these political jurisdictions evolved into regulatory boundaries although
clearly the economics of natural monopoly rms do not necessarily dictate that
rm or product boundaries match those of the states.24
Second generation studies: Capture and accountability
Easterbrook (1983) dismisses the idea that capture at the state level is higher
than at the federal level, as often suggested. He argues (footnote 52) that "it
would be easier for interest groups to obtain protective legislation from states,
because the coalitions needed to support the laws would be smaller. But be-
cause the detriments of the legislation would fall on a more concentrated group,
and because it is easier to move away from local governments than from the
United States, it is di¢ cult to know whether interest groups in fact exercise
more power at the local level than in Congress." Seabright (1996) argues that
incomplete contracts considerations matter in this respect because if everything
could be specied in a contract, decentralization would be irrelevant; it is be-
cause contracts are incomplete that accountability matters. Then using an in-
complete contracting framework, he argues that central powers are less account-
able because they do not face electoral pressures for decisions in one particular
sub-central unit. Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999) explain however that the ef-
24Obviously, the states got their shapes for reasons that have nothing to do with the optimal
size of regulated projects (see Stein, 2008).
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fectiveness of capture at each level depend on specic political conditions that
vary across jurisdictions. Marshaw and Rose-Ackerman (1984) argue that the
support of producers to centralization or decentralization depends on the par-
ticular industry structures and on the specic results they may obtain. Rodden
and Wibels (2002, footnote 12) argue that a key problem with informational
arguments in favor of decentralization is that information-constrained voters
might be more inclined to monitor the central government than local govern-
ments25 and that shared or overlapping authority might make accountability
more di¢ cult. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) relate corruption incentives to the
vertical structure of government. They argue that when central governments
have a strong grip on the lower layers of government, corruption levels are lower
becauce a double marginalization problem is avoided. Local corrutption levels
can be reduced, however, when political competition is strong.
Spector (2007) and Woroch (1990) discuss the possibility that decentralized
levels have shorter time horizons. This may be related to citizen mobility or
political volatility, which may vary across regions. For example, it can be argued
that the EU Commission (EC) is more immune to political volatility than the US
Federal government because the main political parties are by design represented
in the EC.
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) compare two type of non-benevolence (bribes
in centralization, electoral capture in decentralization) with a variety of instru-
ments available (user fees or taxation) in the case of decentralization. Policy
makers decide on the levels of service delivery for a segment where the only
relevant costs are constant marginal costs (the xed costs correspond to an ex-
ogenous upstream producer to whom deliverers buy). Results for each case are
compared to a rst and second best (with deadweight loss of taxation) in terms
of e¢ ciency, welfare (e¢ ciency plus equity between two demand types for each
region) and level of service delivery. User fee nance dominates decentralization
with local taxation because voluntariness of local fee nancing constraints the
extent to which elites may be overprovided at the expense of non-elites. De-
centralization with central grants may dominate centralization and user fees in
specic cases.
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997b) provide an extensive and insightful review of
the exemption from anti-trust legislation that the states often enjoy in the U.S.
This exemption goes back to the US Supreme Court Parker case, where a policy
decision by the state of California granted a cartel to producers of agricultural
products overwhelmingly consumed outside of the state of California. Although
Inman and Rubinfeld criticize this particular case for not taking spillovers into
account, they claim that in many cases, in the absence of such spillovers, states
policies should be exempted from antitrust legislation if they satisfy the condi-
25 If we take election turnout as a proxy for the amount of information that voters possess,
in Europe this turnout is highest for national elections, lower for regional elections and lowest
for European Parliament elections (other European o¢ ces, such as the European Commission
and the European Council, are not directly elected). This suggests that whereas the national
policies are better monitored than regional policies, European policies are the ones that are
worst monitored.
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tion that the policy is enacted under conditions of political participation. Then,
a state-action doctrine can be invoked in those areas where there are not su¢ -
cient reasons to invoke the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the
US Constitution,26 which are typically used to defend the preeminence of the
federal level. The impressive work of these authors is however vulnerable to two
criticisms: rst, it focuses on a model of "bright lines" regulation, whereas many
regulatory decisions are made by jurisdictions that share regulatory powers; sec-
ond, the more recent literature (see for example Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999,
and Treisman, 2007) shows that it is not clear that more participation goes hand
in hand with decentralized policies. Nevertheless, this work shows that political
participation, together with economic e¢ ciency, is a key element in the role of
decentralized powers. A role for the federal level certainly persists in the case
of pure (national) public goods or positive spillovers if states cooperation is pre-
cluded. In the case of negative externalities the situation is more complicated
because universal agenda setting rules at the federal legislative may imply that
a similar pattern of decisions is adopted at the federal and at the decentralized
levels. In this case, federal intervention shoud be restricted to setting maximum
levels of the externality. To improve the terms of the trade o¤ between politi-
cal participation and economic e¢ ciency, a participation test should take into
account the participation of states a¤ected by spillovers. The authors argue
that although almost all policies have jurisdictional externalities, these should
be taken into account in the architecture of government only when they are
signicant, and that standards of signicance similar to those used for market
denition in anti-trust policy should be used (ie an impact of 5% di¤erence).
Interestingly, throughout their article, the authors argue that participation is
best guaranteed by the legislative power27 (through both well articulated poli-
cies and ex post mechanisms for monitoring), and not by regulatory agencies.28
More generally, this study shows that it is valuable to go beyond the theories
that only consider the demand side of policy making (like the Tiebout model
or in part the market preserving federalism theory) to open the black box of
the supply side, and analyze the whole range of incentives and constraints that
26The Commerce Clause is part of the US Constitution, and it is positive in the sense that
it prescribes that the federal level can intervene in interstate issues. The usually mentioned
"dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause is largely a court-developed doctrine about what
the Commerce Clause did not say, and it is negative in the sense that it restricts states from
discriminating against out-of-state residents (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997, footnote 128, p.
1252).
27 In some occasions, state legislative input and stakeholders participation has not been
enough to prevent regulatory failures. In the restructuring of electricity in California, the chair
of the committee that drafted the legislation "rather than encouraging the usual behind-the-
scenes negotiations of competing bills put forth by di¤erent interest groups, he held marathon
public sessions in which all stakeholders had to work on a single bill together, often into the
wee hours of the morning" (Blumstein et al., 2002). Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) argue that
it is precisely the complexity of regulatory issues (such as arguably the optimal restructuring
policy for electricity) that makes political participation more important, and that this is better
achieved at decentralized levels.
28For an opposite view, Moore (2002) argues that complexity and a higher discount rate
would have made regulatory agencies better qualied than the legislator in designing electricity
deregulation in California.
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drive political and regulatory decisions.
Conclusions of the literature review, types of decentralization and
empirical evidence
Regulation started at the local level, and stayed at that level (as in waste
management, or bus transportation) unless there where economies of scale in
operation (for example, derived from the need for interconnection), commit-
ment advantages or expertise that demanded a higher level. However, many
remnants of local intervention survived in the form of municipal utilities (see
for example the map of California electricity area services in Section 4 below).
Aubert and La¤ont (2002) mention that it was often the rms themselves that
demanded that regulation went beyond the local level because they were of-
ten under political extortion, hinting at little protection of sunk costs at local
level, something extensively conrmed in the case study of the gas industry in
Chicago by Troesken (1996) mentioned above. In the US most of this higher
level regulation in the network industries stayed at the state level. This is as
opposed to a tendency to centralization in general, and in particular in social,
safety and environmental regulation, coinciding with the New Deal with a peak
towards the middle of the XX Century in the US, according to Oates (1999).
In other parts of the world public intervention in network industries also went
beyond the local level, depending on the particular industry and the pre-existing
institutional structure (see Aubert and La¤ont, 2002).
Treisman (2002)29 argues that di¤erent arguments in favour or against de-
centralization refer to di¤erent kinds of decentralization, for example the per-
centage of public expenditure allocated by non-central governments, the num-
ber of government tiers, the number of non-central tiers elected by voters or
the participation of non-central tiers on central decisions. He then collects data
on these di¤erent measures and computes the impact of these di¤erent types
of decentralization on the quality of public services, including health, roads
and water systems. The results are slightly more favourable to centralization
than to decentralization. As opposed to the focus of these notes, however, he
does not examine the impact of any type of decentralization on regulated sectors
where private investment plays an important role. Humplick and Estache (1995)
examine the impact of di¤erent measures of decentralization on the quality per-
formance of road investment, electricity and water, without clear cut results. In
the case of electricity they use a dummy variable for spatial decentralization for
a cross section of countries, without giving many details on how this variable
is computed (eg, does it mean that all relevant legislation and tari¤s are at
sub-central levels?). Beyond this, there is no more systematic empirical work
to my knowledge on the impact of the jurisdictional allocation of regulation in
network industries.
Many of the insights of the federalism literature can be readily applied to
the network industries, but additions to the existing theory may shed further
light on this jurisdiction allocation problem. Some of the insights that have
29Oates (1999) summarizes empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization
and economic growth, concluding that the sign and signicance of results change depending
on the study.
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already been developed are of special relevance to regulated industries, for ex-
ample the importance of commitment not to expropriate investments; and the
interaction of vertical relations in government and in network industries, where
di¤erent institutional levels may take regulatory decisions that a¤ect di¤erent
segments in the value chain. Other insights need to be qualied, specialized and
in some cases de-emphasized if they are to be applied to network industries in
a meaningful way.
For example, the Tiebout model of scal or regulatory competition seems
more applicable to small jurisdictions (the local level) than to the levels at which
network industries are usually regulated (state, country or federal level), because
one of the conditions for the e¢ ciency properties of competition is that there
are many jurisdictions and citizens and rms are unconstrained to move from
one to the other. In the network industries, sunk costs imply that producers are
completely immobile once they make their investments; residential consumers
are in theory mobile, which could move policies toward their interests (and
according to Troesken, 1996, it indeed seemed to have moved into that direction
in the times of local regulation in the US), but in fact there is no systematic or
casual empirical evidence showing that network industry regulation or policy is
currently a fundamental motive for the moving decisions of citizens. In addition,
immobile interests may use lobbying to inuence decision-makers.
It can be argued that some business customers may take their location deci-
sions based on the general regulatory environment or based on the public poli-
cies toward basic inputs such as energy and telecommunications infrastructure,
but then it is not clear whether these business customers always have stronger
preferences for lower prices or for higher network infrastructure prospective in-
vestment levels. Treisman (2007, ch. 4) mentions casual evidence that public
utilities infrastructure and local airports have been used by local authorities to
compete for mobile capital. But such competition for capital may favour only
initially rich regions if heterogeneity is too high, or, if accompanied by subsidies
or lower taxes, may go to the detriment of not necessarily ine¢ cient policies
that benet less mobile factors, such as labour or poor residents. In the case
of the Weingast market preserving federalism argument or the arguments that
see decentralization as an additional mechanism to protect the status quo, the
arguments could be valid at a very general level, but do not seem well suited to
address specic policy issues in given industries.
Network industries present characteristics that are close to the type of goods
that Oates (2002) qualies as local pubic goods with spillovers. Policy innova-
tion and tayloring seem the best arguments that can be applied to defend a role
for subcentral powers in network industries. Scale economies and externalities
seem the best arguments in favour of a role for the federal level. The di¢ culty
lies in the denition and quantication of such spillovers. In telecommunica-
tions, regulated markets have so far been local, not national or international,
although operators are usually national in scope. The relevant externalities
there are network externalities (which must be dealt with non discriminating
interconnection fees) and the desire of national operators and large business con-
sumers to face similar business conditions across local territories. In electricity,
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interjurisdictional spillovers are of a more direct nature: electricity transmis-
sion must optimally cross state and national borders and must be regulated. In
addition, its interaction with wholesale markets must be dealt with in regional
organized markets. Telecommunications and electricity, however, are clearly not
public goods, but congestible networks.
Information, accountability and capture arguments do not tilt the balance
in favour of loading more decentralized or federal structures with regulatory
responsibilities, but o¤er insights into important conditions that jurisdiction al-
location must meet for it to be e¤ective. For example, if decentralized structures
are to have a role, it must be in a framework that provides for limited discretion,
political participation and transparency, in order to facilitate accountability.
There are important examples of "special districts"30 in regulated industries,
such as PJM in the US or the NordPool in Scandinavia and Northern Europe in
electricity. In these cases, it seems that the benets from tayloring the size of the
jurisdiction to t the real externalities or to produce some input or regulation
at as close as possible to the minimum average cost, ie the perfect level of scale
economies, outweighed the costs from not using existing institutions for which
the xed costs had already been sunk and for which there existed a history of
democratic control.
Participation in central regulatory bodies (in a similar way that the länder
participate in the Bundesbank or the US states in the Federal Reserve System,
or Catalonia expects to participate in Spanish industry regulatory bodies ac-
cording to the 2003 Statute of Autonomy) creates an additional veto point that
favours commitment to investment but may limit e¢ ciency enhancing reforms.
In Spain, Catalan parties tried to inuence central regulatory policy by using
their leverage in Spanish politics to move the location of the central regulatory
agency to the Catalan capital, Barcelona. The telecommunications regulatory
agency (CMT) e¤ectively moved in 2004 amidst an uproar from many of the
original sta¤ in Madrid, supported by local Madrid politicians; the former sta¤
eventually negotiated very good conditions for staying in the central adminis-
tration in Madrid if they did not want to move. Among the expected results
from such a change of agency location one would expect this movement to in-
uence the location of some o¢ ces of regulated rms in Barcelona, attracting
business or at least the lobbying branch of businesses to Catalonia; an increase
in the independence of the regulatory agency, making it more di¢ cult for the
central government to inuence and monitor the agency; but at least a short
term deterioration of the human capital of the agency as many of the former
sta¤ decided not to accompany the agency in its move to Barcelona (even if
they were replaced by equally qualied sta¤, the latter would at least need a
learning period and resources had to be spent on recruiting), which was proba-
bly damaging for an agency that had to analyze the competition conditions of
a number of complex markets and potentially impose remedies under the rules
of the EU telecommunications directives. However, a detailed analysis of these
e¤ects has not been undertaken.
30See Eichenberger and Frey (2006).
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Even if one is led to believe that the normative case for local or decentralized
regulation of network industries is weak, the fact is that local and decentral-
ized political powers do have a tendency and strong incentives to intervene in
network industries. Then it is important to look at the implications of di¤er-
ent sorts of interaction between di¤erent levels of government, eg the di¤erence
between cooperative federalism and dual or non-cooperative regulation. Then
the challenge is to design institutions in such a way that decentralized jurisdic-
tions have the motivation to exploit their advantages and do not undermine the
provision of interjurisdictional collective goods (such as market integration or
the exploitation of scale economies). One aspect that is missing in the acad-
emic analysis, but that is widely present in the role of decentralized powers, is
the conict of objectives in setting regulatory policy, for example the conict
between controlling market power and "industrial policy" or security of supply.
This conict of policies plays an important role in the basic model presented in
the next Section.
3 A Basic Model
Although the main contributors to the literature on scal federalism claim that
their tools can be applied to regulatory issues as well,31 in practice the tools have
been mainly used to address issues of taxation and public expenditure,32 and
also environmental regulation.33 Easterbrook (1983) and Inman and Rubinfeld
(1997b) deal with federalism in regulation, but their analyses seem better suited
to address regulation of standards and norms such as professional regulation or
other business restrictions, and although inspiring in many respects, do not
address some important specicities of network industries such as sunk costs
and the relations between vertical segments with di¤erent geographic scopes.
Thus there is not much work on the regulatory federalism of network industries
specically (some exceptions being Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006, and La¤ont
and Pouyet, 2004). In particular there is no work on the role of decentralization
in the introduction of competition (or the interaction between competition and
regulation) in some segments of network industries. One specicity addressed
below in this Section is the interaction between policy conict and investment
incentives in such industries. In Section 4, competition in some segments is
introduced.
In this basic model there are no information problems, and regulatory com-
petition plays no disciplining role. The model also abstracts from laboratory fed-
31Oates (1999, footnote 26, p. 1136) specically claims that "the analysis of "regulatory
federalism" is, in principle, analogous to that of scal federalism. The same general priciples
concerning decentralization apply to scal and regulatory instruments."
32The degree of decentralization is often assessed by the percetange of public expenditure
allocated to lower tiers of government; this may give a distorted picture of decentralization
if the regulation of key industries is very centralized, since public expenditure on regulatory
activities is low.
33See Oates (1999). There is also a well developed literature on the issue of regulatory
competition concerning legislation on takeovers. See for example Bebchuck and Ferrell (2001).
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eralism issues. There are conicts of policy: local politicians or regulators may
be concerned about the welfare of particular rms, input providers or groups
of consumers. They may also be concerned about other issues that are not
essential to central regulators, such as security of supply or ination, both at
the local level. This is di¤erent from the "bundling" of issues in Besley and
Coate (2003), where there is one instrument for every issue and the regulatory
issue is not salient for the electorate. Here we assume in a way that regulation
is too salient (although not necessarily well understood), so salient that local
governments want to achieve several objectives with regulatory policy. More is
o¤ered in the way of motivation of this assumption below.
There are two jurisdictions and potentially one central power that may take
decisions that a¤ect both jurisdictions. Initially, it is assumed that there is one
rm in each jurisdiction, but in subsequent applications and extensions below it
is possible to adapt the model so that the initial rms merge, or so that there is
entry of new rms in local markets. A regulatory policy xi (with i = 1; 2) can be
set locally (xLi ) or centrally (x
C
i ). If x1 = x2, policies are said to be uniform
(centralized policies may be uniform or not, and local policy makers may set
policy at the same level in both countries). If xLi = x
C
i policies are said to be
equivalent. Local and central decision-makers have di¤erent objective functions.
There is a rm decision (investment34 in this basic model, but it could be a
decision to merge or not with another rm as in subsection 5.2 below) prior to
setting policy.35 i and vi are rms prots and consumer surplus in country i.
In the remainder of this section it is assumed that no authority has commit-
ment powers, so that investment is chosen by the rms before the (local and/or
central) authority xes policy.
3.1 Central regulation
There is one central regulator that xes its part of policy xCi to maximize
 [1 + 2] + v1 + v2
subject to both rms willing to participate, where  > 0 measures the degree
to which the welfare of shareholders weighs in the central regulator objective
function relative to consumers (a measure of capture by the regulated industry).
Having in mind the cases of the US and Europe, federal jurisdictions may
di¤er in the scope for capture, and commitment powers at the centralized level.
For example, casual evidence suggests that the central level is more capturable
by businesses in the US than Europe, and that the EU Commission has recently
developed a more populist approach vis-à-vis consumers and has been less able
34Higher policy levels, when the policy is price, benets investment, but in equilibrium with
commitment, the prices may be lower, for example because costs are lower or demand higher
(which lowers prices due to scale economies). See Levine et al. (2005) and Evans at al. (2008).
35Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) assume that the xed cost of the utility producing the
service is nanced by the central government out of central taxes in both regimes; accordingly
they ignore the costs of such nancing when comparing the two regimes, and focus on how
variable costs are nanced.
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to commit, because it is a new institution in search of popular legitimacy. In
the US there is a quid-pro-quo between large rms and large political parties
and in the recent decades the Supreme Court has adopted a more pro-business
stance (see NYT 03/16/2008). Many companies have a US national scope and
most companies do not, at least as yet, have a European scope, and there are
no e¤ective pan-European political parties; so the institutions of supply and
demand for political action are absent or seminal in Europe. But the ability to
recruit experts due to scale economies is probably similar.
Therefore, the central decision makers care about consumer and producer
surplus, giving di¤erent weights to each, with the weights varying across central
jurisdictions.
3.2 Decentralized regulation
National or local regulators care about their specic producers and consumers
plus about some additional objective. Each of the two decentralized jurisdictions
chooses policy with the objective of maximizing total surplus in the regulated




i + vi + 
i
subject to a rms participation constraint.
Hence the conict of policies is located at the decentralized level. Of course,
one can abstract from the di¤erence in objective functions by assuming  = 1
and  = 0, and focus on the role of externalities and the type of interaction (dual
and separate sovereignty, overlapping jurisdiction, complementary jurisdiction)
between regulatory jurisdictions.
Examples of the second objective may include37 :
-Favour some national or local input, eg local employment, local coal.
-Keep a management team in place with whom the political powers have
implicit collusion contracts (for example, the government may develop rules
and legislation to protect the rm against takeovers, in exchange for the use of
the rms cash ow to promote the politiciansobjectives through investment
in the media, sinecures for retired politicians, or political party nancing).
36 may represent an inverse measure of the transaction costs of lobbying of interest groups
other than consumers and shareholders (for example, the management of an incumbent rm
that want to keep their position in case of a takeover). These transaction costs are assumed to
be lower at the local level, because collective action problems are lower at this level, there is
less policy specialization and the mandates of agencies are vaguer. As it is sometimes said, at
the local level all interested parties meet when they collect the children from the same school.
37According to Joskow (2006), the privatization of state-owned utilities was meant to create
high-power incentives but also "to make it more di¢ cult for the state to use these enterprises
to pursue costly political agendas." Note that the careful wording implies that after privati-
zation the use of rms for a variety of objectives is not ruled out. "The components of these
political agendas have included the use of state-owned monopolies for patronage employment,
macroeconomic and redistributive policies, to favor domestic suppliers of fuel and equipment,
and to funnel revenue to government budgets outside of the tax system."
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-Keep domestic ownership of rms operating in the country (see Koehler,
2008, pointing out in particular that some countries seem to have a preference
for the largest banking institution to be domestically owned, and nding that a
bank operating in a country with less transparent and more prone to political
intervention merger policy is less likely to be taken over by foreign institutions).
-Security of supply (used as argument by Spanish authorities to fend o¤ the
takeover attempt of Endesa by E.On).
-National security (used by US authorities to fend o¤ takeover attempts of
US ports by Asian funds).
-Avoid o¤shoring, although this could be more relevant for antitrust than for
regulation of network industries, since it seems di¢ cult that a company owning
network assets can part away with these assets.
-Control local ination in the short run (there are examples of this in Cat-
alonia and Spain).
-Promote information society locally (be high in the broadband penetration
rankings).
-Local health and safety or environmental concerns, which often jeopardize
facility investments decided by national or regional reasons following legitimate
national or regional goals.
-Promote national champions, ie large national rms that are able to compete
at the international level (see Hauer and Nielsen, 2007).38
-Promote prestige projects, the so called "white elephants."
Sometimes, objectives other than total (or consumer) surplus in the a¤ected
market are stated in vague terms, such as promote "competitiveness", where it
is not always clear whether the term refers to a more competitive market, or to
rms becoming more competitive for a given degree or intensity of competition
in markets, or to the jurisdiction being competitive in attracting labour and
capital.
Public policies in general and regulation in particular have xed costs, im-
plying that small jurisdictions will have less formal policies and regulations (see
Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005, on the xed costs of regulation and the reference
on vague law in small jurisdictions). The diversity of objectives captures a sim-
ilar idea to the idea of "taxation by regulation" expressed by Posner (1971),
although the latter did neither emphasize that nor explain why this sort of
"taxation" was more prevalent at the lower levels of government.39 At higher
38 In Australia, France and the UK, antitrust regulators may consider the inuence of a
prospective merger on factors such as balance of payments, employment and regional devel-
opment. See Head and Ries (1997, footnote 3, p. 1107). Neven and Röller (2000) show that
when the relevant market encompasses all jurisdictions concerned, as would be the case in
"global" industries, conict will only arise if antitrust agencies pursue objectives that they are
not supposed to pursue. Since conicts arise frequently, these raises the suspicion that these
other objectives indeed exist. This is so even when antitrust agencies are those of the US and
the EU, where they are legally bound by quite "narrow" consumer welfare standards. These
other objectives must weigh even more in national or sub-central jurisdictions where goals are
more vaguely dened or even where other policy objectives are legally admitted.
39 In some specic issues, centralized structures may be reluctant to decentralize precisely
because they undertake some form of taxation by regulation. For example, in Spain the
central government quite singularly keeps the main local airports under a single organization,
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levels there is more scope for policy specialization and the larger scale alleviates
the conict of policies (for example, if one input is scarce at local level, it may
not be scarce in an integrated market). Also, diversity of objectives also derives
from the sunk cost nature of investments in network industries coupled with
local politics (see Troesken, 1996): local politicians have incentives to use sunk
asets to satisfy local constituencies.
This kind of objectives that sometimes are expressed in vague terms give
high discretion to local policy makers, for example in the objective to protect
the "public interest" of state regulatory agencies that review electricity mergers
in the US (see Wolak, 2007).40 This vagueness is in the nature of public policy
making and the transaction costs of politics, as explained in Dixit (1996).41
Notice that some of the examples may not be associated to higher prots,
so it would not be captured by a decentralized version of . In fact, objectives
such as promoting national champions may actually turn out to be costly for
the rms shareholders.
Even if the reasons for having additional objectives remain theoretically un-
convincing, the fact is that local regulators do seem to be less focused when
setting regulatory policy. Here are three examples (one hypothetical but realis-
tic, the other two factual):
-A mayor in a little village puts his ngers in every cake, because people
reach him or her due to low political transaction costs, whereas at higher levels
in the administrative hierarchy the transaction costs are higher and the xed
costs of specialization can be more easily amortized.
-Giving up instruments does not imply giving up objectives. Some instru-
ments are available at the central level and not at decentralized levels. The
EU controls ination through the European Central Bank, but member states
do not have specic instruments to control ination, which does not mean that
they are not concerned by the costs of ination and try to leverage a variety of
available instruments to control local ination.
-In the US, federal regulatory agencies are specialized (FERC, FCC) whereas
state regulatory agencies (PUCs) are multi-industry.
3.3 Firms, investment and externalities
In this basic model, one rm in each country decides an investment level at
cost C(I) = 'I
2
i
2 prior to governments xing policy. This investment has an
to cross-subsidize loss making small airports with the prots of large airports and possibly to
achieve other geographic redistribution objectives.
40Joskow (2006, p. 24): "In the US and some other countries (eg Spain), default service
prices or tari¤s have been used to support a number of objectives other than promoting a
robust retail market. These include commitments that retail customers will receive an imme-
diate and sustained price reduction of some magnitude, stranded cost recovery considerations,
income redistribution goals and consumer protection goals."
41This may be related to the view expressed by Joskow (1974), of regulatory agencies
as driven by a satiscing more than maximizing behaviour. This article observes that the
statutes establishing most regulatory agencies are quite vague, and that the primary concern
of regulatory agencies has been to keep nominal prices from increasing.
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impact on the demand function or consumer valuation (eg, in telecommuni-
cations markets, upgrading the network allows people to subscribe to highly
valued broadband services; upgrading a transmission electricity network accom-
modates demographic growth or new transport systems, such as high speeed




and i = (Ii + tIj)   xCi , with 0  t < 1, a parameter reecting the inter-
jurisdictional externality. This captures the idea that the network in one juris-
diction may have higher value to consumers when the neighboring jurisdiction
has a better network.
3.4 Analysis
Case A: Central Regulation
The regulatory decision vector (xC1 ; x
C
2 ) maximizes  [1 + 2]+v1+v2. The
solution (xC1 (I; t); x
C
2 (I; t)) is a function of the vector of investments I = (I1; I2),
the externality parameter t, and . So the key thing is how investment and
externalities relate to the ex post central regulators objetive function.
The central regulator xes policy such that the ex post surplus of producers
is  times that of consumers:
xCi = 

Ii(1 + t)  xCi





1+ . Then at










Equilibrium investment increases with the level of spillovers and (non lin-






Case B: Local Regulation
In this case, externalities are not internalized and investment depends on
the relationship between the second objective and investment. Ex post, the
regulatory authority maximizes i + vi + 
i for a given level of investment, ie
it maximizes xLi +










Then  can be interpreted in Posners terms as a measure of taxation by
regulation which is politically attractive due to immobility of assets.
Policy and investment must be related to prot and consumer surplus in the
same way as in the central regulation case, for the comparison to be meaningful.
So given that the same weight is given to consumer surplus and prots at the
local level, and given unit demand42 and the sunk nature of investments, the
decentralized regulator actually sets policy to maximize the second objective.
Assume 
i(xLi ; Ii) = Ii lnx
L
i   xLi , ie the second objective is concave so that
42So deadweight loss play no role in this basic analysis.
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there is an interior43 optimal policy vis-à-vis this second objective, and the
regulatory decision and private investment are complements. For example, the
local investments of a national champion will be a springboard for international
expansion (or used to satisfy security of supply concerns, or the promotion of
certain fuels and/or technologies in addition to short run consumer surplus)
only if accompanied by high revenues in the current period.
Then the optimal local policy is xLi = Ii. At the investment decision stage,




solution yields ILi = 1. This is higher than I
C
i if 1 >
(1+t)
2(1+) . In the case that




4 . As t increases, I
C
i increases but it never
reaches 1 (it never even reaches 1/2) because t is bounded at 1. A similar logic
applies for any positive value of . For ICi to be higher than 1 it should be the
case that t > 2 + , which is not possible because t < 1 by assumption. In
this example, investment is higher when regulation is at the local level because
the second objective is used as a commitment device.
The key thing here is how policy and/or investment potentially relate to
the second objective. We want this relationship to be general enough to ac-
commodate a variety of possibilities, but also tractable enough to allow for an
interpretable and insightful solution of the model.
If we introduce an additional parameter  2 [0; 1] in the second objective,
then 
i(xLi ; Ii) = Ii lnx
L
i  xLi and xLi = Ii. Then the rm chooses investment
to maximize Ii  I
2
i
2 . The solution yields I
L




To the extent that  varied across jurisdictions, the regulatory policy would
vary across jurisdictions, although here  is kept constant for simplicity. Then




i if t > 4  1. That is, if the externality is high
enough relative to , central regulation achieves higher investment than local
regulation. Or, if we let  vary and x the externality at some level, say t = 12 ,
then central regulation achieves higher investment than local regulation if




which happens when  > 43 4 , ie when the weight of prots in the central
regulators objective function is high enough relative to the degree to which
the combination of the regulatory policy and investment impact on the second
objective of local regulators. Policy makers may value investment directly in
this second objective for example if the capital providers in network industries
also contribute to this second objective. For example, in Catalonia, the main
shareholder in gas, water, highways and telecommunications is "la Caixa," a
large and very inuential non-prot savings bank which captures the deposits
43The second objective may also be interpreted as the reduced form of a number of several
additional objectives, for example a combination of promoting national champions and keeping
low ination, in which case the intuition is that the regulatory policy (a regulated tari¤, for
example) must be not too high as to cause high ination and not too low as to reduce the
cash ow of expanding rms.
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of a large fraction of the population and is involved in social activities as a result
of its foundational nature.
The following examples illustrate the role played by parameter :
-In periods of high ination,  is low. The weight of objectives for which a
high level of rm investment is needed is low relative to the weight given to the
objective of keeping prices low to contribute to reduce the rate of increase of
the overall price level. In this case, we expect investment under a local regime
to su¤er. In periods of low inlfation, the opposite happens and  increases.
-If the local policy makers have a concern for achieving some sectoral target
such as scoring high in some measure of investment in renewable energy or the
information society, then policy makers have a direct concern for investment.
This investment was made in the previous period, but has a positive impact on
the current periods second objective (it also has a positive impact on the current
periods consumer surplus; policy makers may perceive ego rents for having a
high reputation for respecting contracts) only when combined with a positive
level of the current period regulatory instrument. High policy levels may mean
higher rm cash ows which may be shared collusively between policy makers
and managers; if the bargaining power of both colluding parties is intermediate,
then some of the cash ow may be pocketed by stakeholders "in the normal
way, giving them an incentive for investment" and some of the money may go to
investment in the desired second objective. The exchange between stakeholders
and policy makers goes along the following lines: "OK, I give money for your
second objective, but you have to allow me to earn enough revenues so that I
also get away with something."
If a more intertemporal perspective was taken, clearly the fact that the
second objective of the local governments may change from time to time due to
the global policy environment introduces an additional level of volatility that
may be absent at the central level because of the more focused objective function
at this level. This would increase the costs of investment reducing the relative
attractiveness of the local regime.
The result that central powers not always facilitate better commitment
echoes the arguments by Sah (1991) that authoritarian regimes may provide
sometimes vary good policies, but their variablity is higher than more parti-
patory regimes. A central agency in a government presided by Hugo Chavez
may be very focused, but will probably have less commitment ability than a
provincial unfocused agency.
Lack of commitment was assumed. Of course, if there is commitment and
there are no other regulatory imperfections, there is no problem: everything
could be regulated and markets would not be necessary. Some degree of im-
perfect commitment could be assumed (through some role for reputation or
contracts) and the conclusions should have to be qualied accordingly.
One shortcoming of the present analysis is that regulatory decisions are
treated as binary options (decided at central or decentralized level), whereas
in practice di¤erent levels interact44 in decisions that a¤ect basically the same
44Rodden (2005) argues that "authority over taxation, expenditures, borrowing, and policy
26
issue, for example decentralized bodies taking decisions subject to the constraint
of some rule decided at the central level. Central policies constrain local policies
as in Caillaud et al. (1996): one can distinguish three types of regulatory
decisions, as in eg the vehicle inspections (objectives, rules, implementation).
See for example Footnote 20 (p. 20) in Lehman and Weisman (2000): "The
Supreme Court resolved the jurisdictional issue in that the FCC can promulgate
national pricing rules, but it is still left to the states to actually set the price
levels under those rules. Rodden (2005): "case studies and systematic attempts
at cross-national data collection reveal that in most policy areas, at least two
or three layers of government are jointly involved in funding, regulating and
implementing policies in federal and unitary systems alike".
The conict of policies at sub-central levels presents a dilemma between
static and dynamic e¢ ciency: although using only one instrument for several
objectives is detrimental for allocative e¢ ciency, for some of the objectives other
than controlling market power this dilution of regulatory incentives may favour
private investment, because there is less risk of expropriation; if regulatory re-
sponsibilities are allocated at the central level, ie without conict of policies,
sharper regulatory incentives mean that unless there is strong regulatory com-
mitment the underinvestment risk may be higher. A key issue is how the second
objective of local powers interacts with the regulated rms invesment. One pos-
sible role for the central powers is to alleviate the conict of policies so that the
allocative e¢ ciency at the sub-central level is increased. For example, improving
security of supply in energy at the EU level may alleviate the conict of poli-
cies in the member states between controlling market power and guaranteeing
security of supply.
4 Extensions and Applications to Telecommuni-
cations and Electricity
In this Section, the previous framework is extended and applied to network
industries such as telecommunications and electricity (and energy in general,
including gas) in the US and the EU which combine multiple jurisdiction reg-
ulation with some degree of competition. It is useful to start by mentioning
important di¤erences both between the US and the EU and between telecom-
munications and energy.
General di¤erences between US and Europe include the following:
-Absence of state aid policy in the US, but some common environmental and
social regulation.
-Absence of antitrust state policy in the US following" (see Inman and Ru-
binfeld, 1997).
-More sovereignty in the EU member states.
decisions is inherently murky, contested, and frequently renegotiated between governments,
with federal constitutions analogized to the "incomplete contracts" of industrial organization
theory."
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-Regulation (both federal and states) is older in the US. It grew starting in
the second half of the XIX century and reaching a peak with the New Deal in
the 1930s as a product of the second industrial revolution and the growth of
cities and business. Ideology and interst group action rst, and economic crisis
subsequently, combined to increase the role of government in the economy.45
-The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) grew up in a culture of dual federalism (under
laws that attempted to clearly divide responsibilities), whereas European regu-
lation started with a culture of cooperative federalism, where industry directives
provided for a framework of shared responsibilities, at least in telecommunica-
tions.
-Unlike the FCC and FERC, state commissions usually are responsible for
the regulation of a variety of industries. In Europe, there are separate national
regulatory agencies for telecommunications and energy, with varying degrees of
independence.
-Mutual recognition or host country rule are specic concepts that are used
in Europe to portray a situation of regulatory competition (see Gual, 2007, and
Baron, 1995). Market integration in specic industries is said to make a choice
between these options or harmonization.
-The federal government in the US is partisan (although with divided gov-
ernment) whereas the federal government in Europe is multi-partisan and coop-
erative in the sense that in works by building consensus among member states.
More generally, there is varying commitment ability across government levels
and varying political volatility. Exit pressure (through mobility) also varies, for
example individuals mobility higher in the US (although rms are also under
renewed pressure to "move" incorporation or plants in Europe).
Di¤erences between electricity and telecommunications include the following:
-In telecommunications the ability of technology to overcome jurisdictional
borders is larger, but the "transmission" segment of the networks is competi-
tive and mainly unregulated (although policy can a¤ect these markets). The
implication of this is that there is no need for a regulatory authority that has
jurisdiction over this potentially very large segment of the market in telecoms,
whereas the need exists for electricity, which creates additional tensions in this
industry. Perhaps this helps explain why federal energy policy is less developed
than federal telecommunications policy both in the US and the EU.
-Telecommunications seem to be in transition towards an imperfect competi-
tion model, where natural monopolies seem completely absent, which would call
for basically an ex post competition policy model instead of ex ante regulation.
Shelanski (2007) argues that this does not imply the absence of any type of ex
ante regulation (for example, network interconnection should still be regulated
in many cases, and some distributional and saftey objectives should still be in
place), and also it does not imply that competition policy should not be adapted
to some specic features of telecommunications (for example, the absence of an
essential facilities doctrine in the US Supreme Court jurisprudence should be
45See North (1981, ch. 14).
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taken into account to develop specic requirements to make sure that incumbent
networks provide interconnection to entrants). In a similar way, in electricity
competition policy should be adapted to the fact that the physical characteris-
tics of electricity transmission (creating geographic areas of congestion) and low
demand elasticity make the exercise of market power possible with low industry
concentration levels at the wholesale level.
-In electricity, spillovers are concentrated in the transmission function and
the link between generation and transmission (wholesale markets). Transmission
is a natural monopoly and is regulated. And the link is regulated by also
regulated system operators that may or may not be also in charge of operating
the wholesale market itself and monitoring market power in it. Distribution is
local but the voltage level at which distribution becomes transmission is unclear
and it somehow arbitrarily varies accross countries.
4.1 Telecommunications
4.1.1 Theoretical insights
In Woroch (1990), cooperative or one single regulation may be dominated by
two regulators even though two regulators does not yield constrained e¢ ciency.
Then it may be useful to analyze, in particular contexts, whether regulatory
interaction yields better results under cooperation or non-cooperation
Take an industry where there is a vertically integrated incumbent that faces
the entry of n new rms, which must use some element of the incumbents net-
work at a regulated tari¤ a. Linear demand is assumed: P = 1 Q. Regulators
have an instrument of structural regulation, n, and an instrument of behavioral
regulation, a.
At the retail level, rms compete imperfectly; the entrant faces no mar-
ginal retail cost, and the only cost for the entants is the unit access price, a.
Incumbents operating costs are normalized to zero.
The analysis here looks at how the choice of n interacts with behavioral
regulation. The choice of the number of access based entrants can be interpreted
as a stance towards concentration in merger policy or as a policy to expand
markets eg through network interconnection.
1) With Stackelberg retail competition, for given a, rst the incumbent
chooses its quantity q1, and next the followers simultaneously choose their quan-
tity qn.
By backward induction, the analysis must start by the entrantsdecision.
At this stage, an entrants prot is n = (P (q1;qn)  a)qn.







QS = 12 + n
1 2a
2+2n
pS = 12   n 1 2a2+2n
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Then for given n and given a, the prots of the rms (incumbent and en-
trants, respectively) and the consumer surplus46 are:








2   n 1 2a2+2n
i
+ an 1 2a2+2n
Sn(n; a) = (p
S   a)qSn = (12   n 1 2a2+2n   a) 1 2a2+2n
CSS(n; a) = 12

QS(1  pS) = 12 h( 12 + n 1 2a2+2n )( 12   n 1 2a2+2n )i
The following cases are analyzed:
-First case: a decided by the federal regulator, and n decided by the local
regulator. Assume that the federal regulator cares about a weighted sum of
all producersand consumers surplus; the local regulator, assuming entrants
are foreign, cares about the sum of the incumbents surplus and consumer
surplus. Then under a "bright lines" regulatory model, both regulators non-
cooperatively.
In this case, it can be shown that the access price in equilibrium is negative
(to be interpreted as price below marginal cost, which has been assumed to be
zero) and the equilibrium number of entrants is 1. Along the lines of Sarmento
and Brandao (2006), it can further be shown that this case yields incumbent
rm underinvestment, in case that an investment stage is added to the problem.
That is because the access price is used to eliminate market power at the retail
level, which reduces the incentives of the incumbent to invest. If (partial) dereg-
ulation implies disbanding one regulatory agency but not the other, as Woroch
(1990) argues "market forces will adjust rates to attain marginal conditions for
e¢ ciency in the deregulated markets, but distortions will persist in regulated
markets. As long as the industry falls short of achieving desired conditions in
all markets, there is no guarantee that welfare will improve.
-Second Case: n decided by the federal regulator, and a decided by the local
regulator. In this case, it can be shown that the optimal number of entrants is
0, because the federal regulator anticipates too high an access price to be set by
the local regulator, who does not take into account the interests of the entrants.
-n and a decided cooperatively, also results in a zero number of entrants.
2) When retail competition is à la Cournot, quantities at the retail level are

















n+4 (a+ an+ 1); Q
C = 2an a+3n+4 , and P
C = a+n 2an+1n+4 .
Prots and consumer surplus are:






  7a2n2   14a2n+ 2a2 + 3an2 + 4an+ 4a+ 2n+ 2
Cn (n; a) = (p
C   a)qCn = (3a  1)2 n+1(n+4)2
46Given linear demand, this is simply the triangle area between the demand curve and the
market price.
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CSC(n; a) = 12

QC(1  pC) = 12 h 2an a+3n+4 (1  a+n 2an+1n+4 )i
The non cooperative choice of n and a are as follows:
-First Case: a decided by the federal regulator, and n decided by the local












Under a solution of the federal regulators problem, if for example  = 1,
then the reaction function of the regulator is a(n) = 3n
2 4n 1
8n2 14n+5 .




C1 (n; a) + CS
C(n; a)
	
Taking the rst order conditions, the reaction function of the local regulator
is n(a) = 5 23a8a 2 . For this to be a positive number, we need
5 23a
8a 2 > 0 !
sign f5  23ag = sign f8a  2g. But if a = 1k , then for 8a   2 > 0 we need
k < 4, and for 5  23a we need k > 23=5, and both inequalities cannot hold at
the same time.
We conclude that an interior Cournot equilibrium does not exist in this case.
-Second Case: n decided by the federal regulator, and a decided by the local
regulator.












From the rst order condition, if  = 1, then the reaction function of the
central regulator using the second solution is n(a) = 3a+8+8a 96a 5+7a =
11a 1
13a 5 . This
reaction function is negatively sloped:
@ 11a 113a 5
@a =   42(13a 5)2 < 0
Three points in this reaction function are:
a = 12 ! n =
11 12 1
13 12 5
= 2117 = 1: 235 3
a = 13 ! n =
11 13 1
13 13 5
= 3125 = 1: 24
a = 14 ! n =
11 14 1
13 14 5
= 4133 = 1: 242 4




C1 (n; a) + CS
C(n; a)
	
The reaction function of the local regulator using the rst order condition is
a(n) = 10n+3n
2+1




@n =   2(10n2+32n 5)2
 




The number of rms and the access price are strategic substitutes, because
both reaction functions are negatively sloped.
Three points in this reaction function are:
n = 1! a = 10+3+132+10 5 = 1437 = 0:378 38
n = 2! a = 20+12+164+40 5 = 13 = 0:333 33
n = 3! a = 30+27+196+90 5 = 58181 = 0:320 44
Looking at the examples, three points along each negatively sloped reaction
function can be drawn and it can be seen that at the Cournot equilibrium
1 < n < 1:24 and 0:33 < a < 0:378. Hence the number of rms will be between
1 and 2 and the access price will be slightly higher than 1=3.






C1 (n; a) +
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Cn (n; a) + CS
C(n; a)
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The solution of this problem involves a negative access charge and a number
of rms between 4 and 5, which would probably be unacceptable to the local
regulator, who does not take into account the interests of the entrants.
Both in the US and the EU there has been a transition in the recent past from
local (national or state) regulation of nal prices of vertically integrated rms
to central (European or federal) regulation of wholesale prices accompanied by
deregulation of nal prices. However, the deregulation of nal prices has not
been universal and local powers still have a saying in the conditions of retail
markets. Then, applying the above model, it would be useful to analyze this
case as a transition from local regulation to complementary regulation
with a potential nal disappearence of the local level.
In addition to the benets of avoiding non cooperative decision making
when there is interaction, cooperation has other obvious benets which must
be weighed against the transactional costs of cooperation. Some of the benets
are described by Bernstein (1955, p.247): "Cooperation between governments
in enforcing regulations helps to plug loopholes in enforcement machinery and
enables di¤erent governments to pool their information and sources of evidence
about violations."
4.1.2 Allocation of Jurisdiction in US telecommunications
Starting with New York and Wisconsin in 1907, state Public Utility Com-
missions (PUCs) regulated telephone services before any federal intervention.
Federal regulation of the telephone industry began in 1913 witht he so called
Kingsbury commitment, an agreement by the AT&T and the federal govern-
ment that the industry would be a regulated monopoly, initially regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission and after 1934 by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC)47 when activities ow across states, and by the
states when they do not (see Teske, 2004). For the half century between the
47The FCC had a predecessor in the Federal Radio Commission, which was established in
1927. See Bernstein (1955).
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1934 Telecommunications Act and the divestiture of ATT in the 1980s, there
was a neat and basically non problematic separation of jurisdiction between
the states (intrastate tari¤s) and FCC (interstate tari¤s).48 The distinction be-
tween interstate and intrastate issues49 goes back to the railways controversies
of the XIXth Century and the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(the rst federal regulatory commission, which was used as an administrative
model when other regulatory commissions such as the FCC and the federal
energy regulatory agency were created in the XXth Century).50 The legal rea-
soning behind the traditional interstate and intrastate commerce split proceeded
through trucking in the 1930s. Controversies increased in telecommunications
with the introduction of competition rst in long distance51 and in the nineties
in local competition, especially as they a¤ected common costs and access to
infrastructure. In general, the FCC over this process pushed for deregulation
and competition, while the states resisted the process or tried to micro-manage
it to avoid losing the redistribution powers of the old regulatory system. A
merger wave has accompanied the whole reform of the last years: the Bell re-
gional companies have consolidated and vertically re-integrated. The Federal
Communications Commission gained new powers relative to statesjurisdiction
as a result of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,52 which left many aspects to
be lled. Specically, it was the agency in charge of authorizing the local com-
panies entry in long distance, and it xed the criteria for wholesale prices of
local telephony, which were nally xed by the states following these criteria.
In wireless telecommunications, prior to 1993, states had the power to reg-
ulate prices and terms of service (Parker and Röller, 1997, explain how the
states used this power). The potential for competition was limited because the
Federal Communications Commission had assigned radio spectrum for cellular
communications to just two providers in each locality, one of which was the old
Bell operating company.53 It was a clear example of federal structural regula-
tion and state behavioral regulation. But under the umbrella of an Omnibus
48See Woroch (1990).
49For example, Supreme Court jurisprudence allowed southern states to enforce racial seg-
regation in intrastate trains but not in trains that crossed states borders (see Palmore, 1997).
50There is a nice link between the distinction of interstate vs. intrastate and the "taxation
by regulation" concept coined by Posner that was mentioned above. Kahn (2008) argues
that when states can use local regulation to create a strategic advantage for local rms in an
integrated market, then regulation shoud also be decided at the integrated level, in a similar
way that nowadays there should be some global authority that xes environmental, labor
and safety standards, so that these are not used strategically by di¤erent nations to protect
national interests in a globalized world.
51The acceleration of long distance competition was the result of the break-up of the Bell
System. This acceleration introduced tensions in the system of cross-subsidies that allowed
local residential rates to remain low. Cohen (1992) reports how the states reacted di¤erently
in setting local rates, depending on the relative weight of a number of interest groups and
on several elements of the institutional and political structure of states (political majorities,
degree of oversight of legislature over regulators, direct election of regulators).
52Furchtgott-Roth (2006) criticizes a regime that allegedly a¤ords too much power and
discretion to the federal regulatory agency, relative to the Courts, the legislators and the
states.
53See Hahn et al. (2003).
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Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Washington preempted state authority over
rate and entry regulation in mobile telephony. The addition of more spec-
trum allocated through federally organized auctions along with technological
improvements facilitated the assembly of six national service networks (some
of which subsequently consolidated through mergers, but still leaving most US
citizens with a choice of more than three cellular networks). Washington did
leave states some authority to regulate mobile phone service under the general
rubric of consumer protection. Some states have controversially used this au-
thority, for example California in its Telecommunications Bill of Rights, which
limits phone service providersdiscretion in a wide range of activities, with the
focus on disclosure of contract terms and redress in cases in which customers
are not satised with service. Hahn et al. (2003) argue that the potential costs
for the operators of these requirements imply that they "skate dangerously close
to a¤ecting wireless rates and terms -an area not covered by state regulation."
They also make an interesting use of the arguments of externalities and capital
mobility mentioned Sections 2 and 3 above against decentralized intervention:
"The mobile communications industry, in ironic contrast to the people who use
it, is not mobile. Providers of national service have a considerable stake in a
strong presence in every state. Thus, while a state regulatory climate may af-
fect the pace of local investment, one cannot depend on wireless communications
providers facing onerous state rules to vote with their feet."
It is not clear the extent to which the states lost regulatory jurisdiction as a
result of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Crandall (2005) wrote, nine years
after the law was introduced, that "local retail telephone rates, intrastate long-
distance rates, carrier connection rates, and even high-speed business rates are
still highly regulated in most states." Brennan (1996) identies 22 issues on
which the states have jurisdiction according to the Act, although one important
piece of state regulation was preempted by the Act: the decision on local entry
in telecommunications. Local powers (municipalities and counties) also kept
jurisdiction on franchise conditions for Cable rms,54 although they had already
lost the responsibility of setting prices. Brennan (2001) argues that they should
keep, through these franchise conditions, the ability to decide on open access for
Internet Service Providers on the grounds that the involved markets are local
and there are no relevant spillovers on the decision that one local jurisdiction
takes. He adds the caveats that the decisions on open access or otherwise
should be made separate from trying to use franchises to interfere with merger
decisions, in order to avoid the hold up problem of a locality trying to capture the
e¢ ciency rents from a large, potentially national merger (in a similar way as it is
explained below in the electricity section); and that the decisions on open access
should not be used to ask the operators for in-kind compensations such as free
institutional channels or other initiatives that have an impact on scal issues.
The telecommunications companies started to provide video services competing
54Nuechterlein and Weiser (2007, p. xxiii): "Since the dawn of cable television several
decades ago, the states and thousands of local governments have played a critical role in
deciding the terms on which cable companies can use public rights of way to provide multi-
channel video services to end users."
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with cable in the 2000s, and asked the FCC and Congress to pass national rules
exempting them from local franchise conditions, on the argument that it would
be too costly to negotiate with thousands of local authorities when there are
scale economies in setting a programming platform and launching service at the
national level. Some states such as Texas in 2005 gave these companies the relief
that they were seeking at the national level.
Nuechterlein and Weiser (2007) have many references to federalism issues in
their book on telecom regulation reform in the US. They explain how (chapter 2)
experimentation by states, FCC and courts led to local competition provisions
in the 1996 Act. In the 1996 Act (chapter 3), the FCC reserved for itself the
right to validate the check list of conditions for the local incumbents to have
their quarantines ended; the FCC created a federal universal service fund to
cope with the unsustainability of cross-subsidies as a result of competition in
selected segments (cherry-picking). Interestingly, they characterize two distinct
periods in terms of the relationship between the FCC and the states:
1) Since the 1934 Communications Act until the Telecommunications Act of
1996, the system can be characterized as one mainly of dual jurisdiction: the
FCC in charge of interstate issues, the states in charge of intrastate issues. This
did not exclude some areas of cooperative federalism, as in the Joint Board that
decided somehow arbitrarily that the proportion of joint costs that should be
allocated to long distance interstate calls should be exactly 25%.
2) After 1996, the FCC and the states engaged more strongly in cooperative
federalism in deciding the terms under which local telecommunications entrants
should share the infrastructure of incumbents: the FCC would x the rules un-
der which these infrastructures would be used, and the states would implement
these rules deciding the exact level of access charges. However, the dual juris-
diction model was kept in retail prices, by maintaining the jurisdiction of state
commissions to x local retail prices. Soon after the Act, the Supreme Court
asserted the FCC jurisdiction in unbundling policies in the Iowa Utilities Board
case, but after that a number of judicial decisions have much narrowed down
the scope of unbundling requirements and the jurisdiction about them both by
the FCC and the states.
According to NRRI (http://nrri.org), the research institute of public utility
commissions, state utility commissions currently have a reduced role in telecom-
munications. In a call for research projects in their web page, they argue that
"The portion of the industry subject to their jurisdiction has declined, as has
their legal authority in many states. Whereas the regulator of 1980 needed skills
to conduct cost-of-service cases, today those skills are much less relevant. More
relevant skills today may be the ability to test for market power or to identify
dated regulations that are doing more harm than good. The state commis-
sioners job is made more di¢ cult because the FCC in many cases fails to give
clear guidance. In some areas the FCC claims jurisdiction, but its follow through
is not thorough. This leaves states uncertain of whether to involve themselves
in problems that concern their local constituents but that may exceed state
jurisdiction."
Legal scholars disagree on what should be the extent of US states involve-
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ment in telecommunications regulation. Ho¢ nger (2003) notes that integrated
market arguments (national business consumers would experience too high costs
with di¤erent telecom regulation in every state) justify uniform regulatory cri-
teria to avoid investment uncertainty; he notes that the 1996 Acts limits the
states responsibilitites to arbitrating between incumbents and entrants when
negotiations between them do not end in agreement, in contrast to wide dis-
cretion to the FCC to ll the voids left by legislation; he concludes that the
Act e¤ectively removed telecoms regulation from the states, and it rightly did
so according to him, since the states would be reluctant to engage into the rate
rebalancing that is necessary to accommodate competition, and they would at
the same time engage in a "race to the bottom" by trying to encourage as much
entry as possible in the short run; he accepts a very specic role for the states
beyond arbitration, in accountable (otherwise, it runs the risk of being biased to
satisfy local political preferences) fact nding as an input to FCC decisions and
participation in FCC policy design based on their experience or proximity. In
contrast, Weiser (2001 and 2003) defends a role for the states in supplementing
FCC oors or minimum standards, in a similar way as environmental regulation
established since the 1970s, based on arguments of local tayloring and experi-
mentation;55 he argues that the role in arbitrating disputes gives the states "a
key role in superintending" the federal regulatory program, and at the same
time reorients the mission of regulators and courts from one of protecting end-
users to one of arbitrating disputes among rival providers, and, in particular,
overseeing access to and pricing of bottleneck facilities; he also argues that the
states role should be constrained, beyond the oors established by the FCC
and federal legislation, in the sense that they should implement federal and
not other objectives; he mentions the Erie and Chevron doctrines, after two
landmark judicial cases, according to which regulatory uniformity should be of
less concern relative to experimentation and tayloring, and the Courts should
defer to regulatory agencies following arguments or expertise in determining the
rules in regulated industries, to defend a role for state regulatory agencies in
cooperation with federal agencies. Weiser (2001) calls the 1996 Act as "perhaps
the most ambitious cooperative federalism venture to date." Both legal scholars,
however, seem to agree that the FCC failed to provide a clear vision of what
should the content of the relationship between state and federal regulation be.
Over the process of implementation of the 1996 Act, the entrants argued
mostly for state discretion on unbundling decisions, which is consistent with the
view that states favoured extensive unbundling of incumbentsnetwork elements.
However, at least in some occasions according to Weiser (2003), they also argued
against state discretion on access pricing, probably reecting the wide variation
in local loop and other network elements prices that were set by the states.
55The FCC accepted a role for experimentation in the unbundling or not of local sub-
loops, before mandating a federal requirement to unbundle them, in an example that an
initial exibility may recede when the federal level learns and establishes that one approach
is clearly superior. According to Teske (2004) the model of local competition promoted by
the Act was itself based on the model of local competition experimented by the state of New
York some years earlier.
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Ho¢ nger (2003) explains that one of the entrants in local telephony, the AT&T,
was initially against a strong role for the states in unbundling decisions, but
changed its position after a new Chairman of the FCC (Michael Powell) signaled
his position against too much unbundling.
Nuechterlein and Weiser (2007) argue that with the advent of cellular tele-
phony or VOIP telephony, the regulatory role of the states will be very reduced,
but will still exist at least to monitor the reliability of emergency services (num-
ber 911 in the US) and the e¢ cacy of universal service programs. However, to
the extent that physical networks will still cross local territories, local powers
will probably also either claim a role, or be asked to provide a role, for example
in providing information for geographycally di¤erentiate markets in broadband
and to solve a collective action problem so that operators can share the use of
rights of way and other physical infrastructure.56
After the 1996 Telecommunications Act the federal level has been increas-
ingly involved in Universal Service policies with the creation of a national Uni-
versal Service fund.57 There is a potential role of states in better targetting
universal service, which now benets broad classes of citizens, with often little
concern for poverty. The jurisdiction of this fund has been disputed by some
states although there is a Joint Board between the FCC and the states on uni-
versal service.58
The FCC has been accused of excessive discretion, increasing delay and
decreasing certainty and humility (Nuechterlein and Weiser, 2007).
4.1.3 Allocation of Jurisdiction in EU telecommunications
For decades, the telecommunications markets in Europe were based on publicly
owned vertically integrated national monopolies. The EC led the liberalization
wave of the nineties, which was accompanied by (to di¤erent degrees) priva-
tization of national incumbents. The EC has been very active in promoting
competition and introduced a system of market analysis in which it monitors
the e¤orts of the member states in ensuring compliance with liberalization di-
rectives. The EU institutions are currently discussing a third reform package
in which the Commssion proposes the creation of a pan-european telecommu-
nications regulator and allows the member states to fucntionally separate the
incumbents infrastructure from its operation in retail markets.
Under the current system, the national regularory authorities must analyze
the competitive conditions of a number of markets and determine, under the
supervision of the European Commission, whether there is signicant market
power in each of these markets. If the conclusion is yes, then the national regu-
latory authorities have discretion to impose remedies. The guidelines issued by
56 In a precedent of this, Weiser (2003) mentions the Utility Pole Attachment Act of 1978
as an example of cooperative federalsim.
57See Chiang et al. (2008).
58There is a tradition of Joint Boards between the FCC and the states to analyze issues of
common interest and reach agreements. As mentioned above, in the XXth Century one such
agreement was on the contribution that long distance interstate callstari¤s should make to
funding common costs of the local network.
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the European Authorities have heavily inuenced a stance of national regulators
in favour of access based competition and pricing of unbundled elements based
on long run incremental costs (LRIC). Gual and Jodar (2007) provide a useful
summary of the results achieved under the current system.
4.1.4 Empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization in telecom-
munications
Many subcentral jurisdictions (states, counties, municipalities) undertake initia-
tives to promote broadband. In some cases (eg city of Barcelona vs CMT, the
Spanish regulator) this is challenged by national regulatory or antitrust authori-
ties in Europe, but not in the US, where the state-action doctrine tends to prevail
(see Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). Treisman argues that when public investment
(nanced with taxes) in infrastructure is a complement to private mobile cap-
ital, decentralized jurisdiction may compete to attract capital by investing in
infrastructure, and this may result in a higher level of infrastructure provided
the initial conditions in the local jurisdictions are su¢ ciently homogeneous. De-
centralization also makes it possible to use existing institutions (so that xed
administrative costs do not have to be duplicated) to di¤erentiate regulation
by geographic markets with di¤erent potential for platform based competition,
and use existing institutions to help solve the collective action problem of the
common use of physical infrastructures. However, others (Ho¢ nger, 2003; Hahn
et al., 2003) argue that the convergent telecommunications industry is national
in nature, and that local regulations introduce unnecessary costs to companies
operating at a national or international level.
Table 1: Determinants of Broadband Performance (OLS)
Variable linear logarithmic
GDPcap .0001322 (2.93) .3492947 (2.84)
Centralization -3.278021 (-1.72) -.1318353 (-1.18)
Urbanicity .0008007 (3.90) .1439248 (2.17)
R2 0.4784 0.3415
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 1 reports the results of a cross section regression with 26 observa-
tions (those for which observations for all variables could be obtained) about
the determinants of broadband performance, including the potential e¤ect of
the degree of scal centralization. Although scal centralization may not be
necessarily correlated to regulatory centralization,59 scally decentralized coun-
tries will have more incentives to undertake decentralized regulatory policies, or
policies related to regulated industries that are decentralized, such as industrial
policies.
59For example, in Spain, in the last 10 years the degree of scal decentralization has increased
very signicantly, whereas the main regulatory responsibilities in airports, telecommunications
or electricity remain centralized.
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The measure of scal centralization used is the total central government
expenditure divided by total general government expenditure (average 2000-
2006).60 This measure is obtained from the OECD data base, except for Aus-
tralia, where the measure was not available and instead the most recent ob-
servation (1999) of the equivalent variable was obtained from the World Bank
scal indicators database.
The measure of performance in broadband is a composite index of price,
speed and penetration of broadband obtained from Atkinson et al. (2008).
From these authors also comes a density measure, urbanicity, that multiplies the
percentage of urban population and the average density of population of urban
areas. Although Canada has a much lower population density than the US (3
vs 30 inhabitants per square km, it has a higher urbanicity index because the
average density of urban areas is higher and the percentage of urban population
is higher as well). The measure of gross domestic product per capita is the
purchasing power parity measure in 2005 in dollars obtained from the United
Nations Human Development indicators database.
As it can be seen from the results of the regression in Table 1 (the data-
base can be seen in Appendix 1) there is no evidence that centralization has
a positive impact on at least this segment of telecommunications performance.
If anything, the impact is negative. In the linear specication, the relevant co-
e¢ cient is negative and it is statistically signicant at the 10% level. In the
logarithmic specication, with a lower R2, the coe¢ cient is negative but it is
not statistically signicant. The quantitative exercise does not say much about
what should be the scope of state, regional and local policies. One possible ex-
ample is di¤erential geographic regulation in broadband markets (as proposed
by the telecom reform document in Canada), but much more work needs to be
done to extend this line of research.
Of course, the database on which table 1 is based is very small and the model
is excessively simple. Several signicant e¤ects may be missing from the model.
Also, the measure of decentralization is very generic and not necessarily related
to regulatory policies. To obtain a more specic measure, in Table 2 we explote
data from the European Commission to address a more specic decentralization
issue, namely the degree to which the decentralization of control of the rights
of way has a positive impact on broadband penetration. The details about
sources and variable denitions can be seen in Appendix 2. The results show
that, controlling for a number of factors that have been seen to be signicant
in previous work, the centralization of the rights of way in the European Union
has a negative e¤ect on broadband deployment.61 This suggests a role of local
powers in assisting to solve the collective action problem of sharing common
infrastructures and rights of way between competing platforms in broadband
telecommunications.
60For Japan, Korea, and New Zealand the average is 2000-2005.
61Distaso et al. (2006) found a non-signicant e¤ect of centralization of the rights of way
with data only until 2004.
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Table 2: Determinants of broadband penetration, EU countries,
















Note: the dependent variable is the percentage of household subscribers divided by the population
4.2 Electricity
4.2.1 Theoretical insights
We extend the framework in Section 3 here to analyze mergers in the electricity
industry. A merger or acquisition (especially if it takes the form of a takeover)
changes the objective function of policy makers because more light is projected
into the industry, consumers and other stakeholders mobilize and this has a
well documented impact on the potential (lower) wealth gains to be extracted
from the transaction. The existing literature shows that mergers in regulated
industries take longer to be completed and show a lower takeover success ratio
than in other industries; there is also clear evidence that deregulation is ususally
accompanied by a takeover wave.
There is a small literature on the optimal allocation of merger authority in
the vertical chain of government. This literature focuses on the role of juris-
dictional externalities in terms of the e¤ect of a merger on the surplus that
is captured by foreign consumers and the impact on foreign competitors, in a
framework where a merger authority maximizes some combination of the surplus
of national consumers and producers. Work along these lines includes Hauer
and Nielsen (2007), Head and Ries (1997) and Neven and Röller (2000). There
is no formal work to my knowledge on the role of regulatory authorities or on
how to judge a merger from the point of view o it making more or less di¢ cult
the role of regulators when there are jursdictional externalities.
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In the model below, the pre-merger industry structure is one in which there
are two rms in each of two local jurisdictions (eg states in the US or member
states in the EU). A cross-border merger is examined where two rms which have
territorial (ie in specic regions of their countries) regulated natural monopoly
assets and competitive assets in their respective countries merge with cost sav-
ings. An antitrust central agency decides in terms of the e¤ect of the merger
on competitive assets (using eg a Cournot model) and the two decentralized
agencies decide in terms of the e¤ects of the merger on regulated assets. The
two agencies decide simulateously how much of the merged rms savings must
be used in a "public interest" project.
The local agencies decide before the central agency (perhaps there is a hy-
erarchical decision making process by which the central agency only comes to
decide if the two local agencies do not veto the merger; there is no point in
approving the merger if the conditions imposed by the local agencies cause the
merging entities to cancel the merger -the decision of the state agencies is contin-
uous and the decision of the central agency is discrete; the central agency then
not only evaluates the rmsdecision, but also the local agenciesdecision). The
central agency will approve the merger depending on the relationship between
the cost savings and . Assuming  high enough, anticipating the approval, the
local agencies will simultaneously decide how much of the merged rms savings
must be spent in a "public interest" project in each local jurisdiction, balanc-
ing the second objective (with weight ) with total surplus in the electricity
market (which has a regulated component and a competitive component). Call
xi 2 [0; 1] the proportion of the rms savings that the local agencies decide
that must be allocated to a "public interest" project in jurisdiction i. Then the
regulatory agency in this jurisdiction solves the following problem:
Max
xi
fi(xi; xj) + vi(xi; xj) + 
i(xiE)g
with @i(xi;xj)@xk < 0 for k = i; j,
@vi(xi;xj)
@xk
< 0 for k = i; j and @
i(xiE)@xi > 0.
For example, assume in a Cournot model that inverse demand in country 1
is P1 = 1  34Q1 with Q1 = q11+q12 before the merger and Q1 = q11+q1M after the





2 after the merger. The total quantity produced by the merged rm
is QM = q1M + q
2
M . The original marginal costs in the competitive segment are
c1 =
1
2 (for both rms in country 1) and c2 =
2
3 (for both rms in country 2).
After the merger, the marginal cost is the one of the more e¢ cient merging rm.
It is assumed that the xed costs are concentrated in the regulated segment and
are fully reimbursed. As a result of the cross border merger the price in country
1 does not change (although we assume that shareholders of country 1 share 12
of the total prot of the merged rm, which includes a now higher prot from
the subsidiary in country 2).




(1  q21   q22)q21   23q21
	
The rst order condition is 1   2q21   q22   23 = 0. The reaction function is
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[ 13   q2]=2 = q2 ! 2q2 = 13   q2 ! q21 = q22 = 19 . The price is: P2 = 1  29 = 79 .
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(1  q2M   q22)q2M   12q2M
	
The rst order condition is 1  2q2M   q22   12 = 0. The reaction function is




(1  q2M   q22)q22   23q22
	
The rst order condition is 1  q2M   2q22   23 = 0. The reaction function is
[ 13 q2M ]=2 = q22 . Solving for the rmsquantitites: q22 = 118 ! q2M = ( 12  118 )=2 =
2
9 . Therefore the new price is P2 = 1   518 = 1318 . And the prots of each rm
(the subsidiary of the merged rm and the outsider to the merger) are
2M = (
13
18   12 ) 29 = 481
22 = (
13
18   23 ) 118 = 1324

















Consequently, this is a welfare improving merger. The increase in total
surplus relative to the pre-merger situation is 59648   681 = 11648 .
The merged rm achieves an increase in prots (derived from the operations
of its subsidiary in country 2) of 281 relative to the pre-merger prots of the
merging rms, while the outsider in country 2 sees a reduction in prots (hence
the merger has a negative externality on the second rm of country 2, which
is more than compensated with a positive externality on the consumers of the
same country). An antitrust authority that has a total surplus standard should
approve this merger.
Now, each regulator wants to use at least a fraction of the merged rms
gains to fund a "public interest" project. The two merging rms gained 281 each
before the merger and now the merged rm gains the same in country 1 and 481
in country 2. So there is a prot gain of 281 to potentially share between the
shareholders of both countries.
Both agencies are interested in the cost savings being as large as possible both
to benet market participants and to have resources to fund the "public interest"
local project. If both agencies decide non-cooperatively,62 however, they play
a prisoners dilemma and the size of the common pool may be reduced relative
to the joint prot maximizing level. Each jurisdiction does not internalize the
e¤ect of the local decision on the other jurisdiction which takes place via the
e¤ect on incentives of the rm to undertake the merger. Assume each country
can choose from a set of two public interest projects: a large costly one and a low
cost one: if both countries choose the high cost project, they satisfy the "public
interest" objective to a large extent, but they exhaust the prot gain and hence
62They may decide non-cooperatively for example because they have "public interest" objec-
tives that are contradictory. For example, a regional government in a European country may
want to favour local industrial development with foreign capital and the national government
of the EU member state may want to protect national ownership.
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their shareholders win nothing (they only have weak incentives to undertake
the merger, and they do not have incentives at all if there is sunk cost to the
merger, for example in administrative costs, lawyer and consultant fees, etc.).
If both choose the low cost project, they partially satisfy the pubic interest
objective and the merger parties still have strong incentives to undertake the
merger (which implies gains for consumers of country 2 and for shareholders of
both countries). However, if the other regulator chooses the low cost project,
one regulator has an incentive to choose the high cost one, as the merger will still
be protable (and hence the public interest project will enjoy more resources).
High Cost Low Cost
High Cost 2,3 6,2
Low Cost 1,7 4,5
There is a prot gain of 181 per country to be spent in both projects; more-
over, in country 2 consumers gain 25648   281 = 172 from the merger. The







. By appropriate choices of parameter  and functions 
i, and by
appropriate choice of units, the specic payo¤s in the example can be obtained
as follows:
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where TSi is the incremental total surplus that can be achieved with the
merger in the market. It is assumed that in case both local regulators choose
the high cost project, the merger takes place with some probability p lower than
1. If the merger does not take place the payo¤ is zero. The merger is assumed
to take place with probability 1 if at least one of the two countries chooses a
low cost project.
The Nash equilibrium nds both local regulators choosing the high cost
project and risking the merger not happening at all. A cooperative solution
between both regulators would achieve the joint payo¤ maximizing combina-
tion of strategies where both regulators choose the low cost project. The same
solution would be obtained with a single local regulator.
The higher payo¤ of the regulator of country 2 accounts for the fact that in
country 2 both consumers and shareholders gain from the merger and in country
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1 only shareholders; moreover, what consumers gain in country 2 is not a¤ected
by the size of the cost of the public project.
It has been assumed so far that the markets are segmented, so there are
two prices and two demand functions. If the merger takes place, in at least
one of the countries the cost will go down, and this will a¤ect the price and
margin, but there will still be two competitors in each country. If the markets
are integrated before the merger there will be three rms instead of four and
there are externalities on non merging rms. One benet of market integration is
that if one of the countries is a monopoly and the other a duopoly, a "defensive"
local merger of the duopoly to become a local monopoly will be less harmful
-there will be a more symmetric duopoly than the one that would result form a
takeover of one of the two local rms by the foreign monopoly.
Additional aspects that deserve closer scrutiny are the role of multi-market
contact and, in telecommunications, complementarity of demand (mergers in-
ternalizing network externalities).
4.2.2 Allocation of Jurisdiction in US electricity
As explained above in Section 2, the regulation of gas and electricity transi-
tioned from the local to the state level at the beginning of the XXth century.
As the scope of the industry grew, the federal government also began to reg-
ulate (See Teske, 2004). The prevailing structure for most of the XX Century
was based on vertically integrated and state regulated investor owned utilities,
with some cases of local municipal or cooperative ownership, but there was
some direct federal involvement in production, exemplied most clearly with
the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930s. Still today, municipal utilities
are not regulated by state commissions but by the city councils.63 Regulation
was mainly at the sate level, with some intervention of the Federal Power Com-
mission (FPC), created in 192064 and having its powers dened by the Federal
Power Act (FPA) in 1935; it was later in 1977 renamed Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commssion (FERC). The FPC and the FERC had a role on interstate
matters, mainly wholesale transactions and transmission that crossed states bor-
ders. The division of regulatory responsibilities was largely not problematic for
many decades.65 However, by 1950, 25% of Americans received power directly
from federally controlled resources. In the 1920s and 1930s the mechanisms of
state regulation were often frustrated by the ownership of electricity rms by
large interstate holding companies, which operated outside of state authority.
The 1935 Public Utilities Holdings Act eliminated holding companies, but some
tensions remained.
Stalon and Lock (1990)66 argue that the pressures imposed on the energy
63The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, for example, is governed by the Los




66One of the authors of this paper, Charles G. Stalon, is particularly well equipped to write
on these issues. An Economist, he served as Commissioner of a state regulatory agency, the
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industries by the economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s encouraged reg-
ulators to seek alternatives to the traditional operation of gas and electricity,
resulting among other developments into the gradual introduction of compet-
itive pressures at the wholesale level. However, tensions between states and
the FERC were previous to the introduction of competition, as FERC tried
to encourage coordination and e¢ ciencies through power pools (agreements to
share power sources between neighboring utilities) and again holding companies
made possible by technological progress in transmission and dispatch control.
However, before the major macroeconomic tensions of the 1970s and 1980s, sta-
ble input prices and productivity growth, complemented by vertical integrated
jurisdictional monopolies, accommodated these tensions and made compatible
the ine¢ cient setting of regulated rates with the nancial viability of utilities.
After major blackouts in the mid 1960s, the FPC accepted industry pro-
posals to create nine industry-run regional reliability councils and in 1968 a
National Electricity Reliability Council (NERC). It was an example of industry
self-regulation in lieu of a potential role for federal regulation. The reliability
councils aimed at establishing the technological rules of the road for the inter-
connected utility systems. In theory, it was about technical and not economic
regulation, but technical decisions had economic implications, for example the
establishment of standards for reserve margins inuenced the determination of
the base rate for state regulation.
As a result of the increasing tension between the need to achieve interstate
e¢ ciencies and the regulatory role of the states, the FERC and the judiciary
introduced a new distinction between the role of the federal level and the role
of the states in the 1980s, called the Pike County Doctrine. According to this
doctrine, the FERC would have responsibility for the cost allocation of interstate
wholesale services, but the states (which were under pressure because of failed
planning decisions) would undertake the prudence review of wholesale purchases
by utilities. This doctrine constrained the ability of the states to inuence supply
planning, but created a new "bright line" that failed to provide a cooperative
environment that tackled what were mainly two interrelated decisions.
The "bright line" or dual regulation model, according to Stalon and Lock
(1990), "has not produced a climate in which regulation is capable of adapting
to fundamental changes in the industry. This concern may be symptomatic of
a problem inherent in any e¤ort to statutorily divide jurisdiction with a bright
line. As conditions change, the bright line needs to be drawn in di¤erent places.
Vested economic and political interests, however, consolidate around an existing
bright line."
Section 210 of PURPA67 (one of the parts of the National Energy Act of
1978), which promotes transactions with non-integrated qualifying facilities (by
which the states found a framework to encourage competitive bidding of supply
procurement) is deemed by Stalon and Lock (1990) a more successful attempt
than any "bright lines" model at achieving a regulatory partnership. The statute
Illinois Commerce Commission, between 1984 and 1989; he also served as Commissioner of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, between 1984 and 1989.
67Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act.
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requires FERC to dene Qualifying Facility (QF) status and to establish the
standards under which QFs may buy from and sell to utilities. It also requires
the state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) to implement FERC rules, giv-
ing PUCs the frontline day-to-day function of regulating both QF sales to and
purchases from utilities, and a variety of related issues, such as interconnection
requirements and compensation. "Hence, the partnership grants FERC author-
ity over a discrete part of retail ratemaking and delegates a signicant portion
of federal wholesale authority to state PUCs." It encouraged a dialogue between
agencies outside a quasi-judicial context to resolve daily state/federal tensions
(between equity and other objectives and e¢ ciency) and made the states more
aware of e¢ ciency needs, although some tensions remained. States showed in
this framework, according to these authors, an ability to learn from mistakes,
adapt and learn from each other.
The redrawing of the frontiers between regulation and markets also implied
the redrawing of the frontier between the regulatory jurisdiction of the fed-
eral level and the states, because the weight of interstates issues increased with
transactions between di¤erent rms and competitive exchanges, and also be-
cause pressures on retail prices (of which competition was a consequence) due
to macroeconomic forces, and the need to pay for mistakes in generation plan-
ning, made it more di¢ cult for the states to keep paying for social objectives
through regulation. However, the states mostly resisted e¢ ciency enhancing
restructuring proposals (for example, vertical separation) for fear of losing ju-
risdiction.68
In 1992 Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, which opened access to
transmission networks and made it easier for nonutility power generators to en-
ter the wholesale market. In 1996 the FERC further issued orders 888 to open
transmission access to nonutilities and order 889 to build electronic systems for
sharing information about transmission capacity. In parallel, some states such
as California were experimenting with wholesale markets and restructuring.69
Figure 1 shows a map of the services areas of California electricity as an exam-
ple of the jurisdictional complexity in which restructuring usually takes place.
Appendix 3 includes a list of retail sellers of electricity in California in 1999.
This process accelerated in the turn of the century with the proposal of the
FERC to create Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) with the mission
of controlling the transmission assets owned by the vertically owned utilities
and operating transmission systems and region wide wholesale markets.70
Wholesale market rules must be led with FERC. There is a regulatory struc-
ture in place after restructuring not only to regulate natural monopoly segments,
but also to monitor wholesale markets, because the fundamental characteristics
68Stalon and Lock (1990) claim that an excessively defensive position by the states may
cause ine¢ cient bypass of the electricity network by large rms: "the best long-term prospect
for reducing end-use customer incentives to bypass is to create an e¢ cient inter-utility trading
system that will reduce the large di¤erentials in average costs between supply systems."
69For a review of the evolution of electricity in California, including an analysis of the 2000
crisis and its aftermath, see Sweeney (2006).
70See Klevorick (2005).
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Figure 1: California electric utilities
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Figure 2: PJM territory
of electricity (very low demand elasticity, unresponsiveness of demand,71 physi-
cal laws of electricity) create a high potential for market power in some instances.
Most states have resisted this process, with the momentum for reform being neg-
atively a¤ected by the collapse of the California deregulated market in 2000 and
the increase of electricity prices in 2008 (Wall Street Journal, July 17 2008). The
PJM system operator (which started in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland
and has expanded to other neighboring states72) is seen as the most successful
example of the type of organization promoted by FERC, although there are
other similar RTO in New England, New York and Texas (Joskow, 2005). The
territory of PJM is shown in Figure 2. PJM or any Regional Transmission Or-
ganization can be interpreted as the outcome of a Coasian process, in which
interjurisdictional externalities are addressed through negotiation and coordi-
nated decision making (Oates, 1999, warns about the "complexities and perverse
incentives that can bedevil such joint enterprises" at creating useful compacts
or associations of jurisdictions to deal with particular issues).
Beyond the promotion of a standard market design in wholesale, the FERC
has accummulated less regulatory powers than the FCC in the liberalization
process. Between 1996 and 2000 half of the states had deregulated their whole-
sale markets, and today state PUCs are more likely to lose e¤ective control over
electricity prices to markets than to FERC regulation.
There is high variation in the extent to which states have embraced retail
71As Klevorick (1996) nicely argues, "the restructuring of the electricity industry entails an
e¤ort to introduce markets in which one blade of Marshalls scissors hardly cuts at all."
72Mansur and White (2008) report price and e¢ ciency gains as PJM expanded.
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competition. Kwoka (2006) relatedly argues that studies aboout the benets
of RTO rarely admit the high costs associated to creating and mainaining such
organizations. The partial deregulation process was accompanied by a merger
wave (Kwoka and Pollitt, 2007) that seems to have come to a halt recently
(Wolak, 2007). A total of 14.3% of US residential customers were served by
public power utilities in 2006, and there where 2014 such public power utili-
ties (see http://www.appanet.org). Klevorick (2005) argues that one important
function the responsibilities of which need to be allocated in some vertical fash-
ion is the market power mitigation of the new wholesale electricity markets. He
suggests that the optimal structure for this would be the FERC delegating a su-
pervisory role to RTOs but retaining nal major investigations or sharing these
with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. The RTO should have
a non prot nature and its boards should not have as objective maximizing the
sum of stakeholders payo¤s but the e¢ ciency of markets (he adds that he is
optimistic that existing institutional arrangements are consistent with this).
4.2.3 Allocation of Jurisdiction in EU electricity
For most of the XX Century and with some exceptions (some private ownership
in Spain, municipal ownership in Norway, regional rms in Germany) the in-
dustry was dominated by national vertically integrated monopolies. Under the
leadership of the EC the industry started to liberalize in the 1990s with two
European directives that mainly promoted retail competition and specialized
national regulators, although this resulted into little actual competition in most
member states due to lack of vertical and horizontal restructuring. A third
package is currently under discussion.73 Over time, the EU institutions have
focused more on transmission arrangements, especially cross-border intercon-
nection. The interconnections have in turn forced some member states to adapt
internal transmission arrangements.
In spite of the electricity directives e¤orts, today Europe is a collection of
separate integrated markets. The most developed of this is the NordPool of
the Scaninavian countries, which includes a common electricity market organi-
zation owned by the di¤erent national system operators. Figure 3 shows the
map of the NordPool territory. The European Commission has been promoting
retail liberalization whereas the US federal level has been promoting wholesale
liberalization.
Joskow (2006) calls this evolution strange but politically astute. The EU
institutions are currently discussing a third package with the proposal by the
Commission of introducing a pan-european regulator and vertically unbundling
transmission assets from other assets, which is strongly contested by some mem-
ber states, most notably France and Germany. Also in Joskow (2006): "Mecha-
73The agreement of the European Council on an internal energy market can be found at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/trans/101008.pdf.
The relevant materials of the third package are at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/trans/101008.pdf
For a critical assesment, see The Economist, June 14 2008.
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Figure 3: NordPool Map
nisms being developed through cooperative activities of European transmission
and power exchange operators and regulators for integrating energy markets
with the allocation of scarce inter-country transmission capacity are moving
forward in Central Europe. And recent EU rules governing investment in in-
terconnector capacity that expands transmission capacity between countries are
very constructive."
Business organizations sometimes but not always try to adapt to political
organization. In Spain and UK there is a history of regional distribution com-
panies; and advising regional branches of national companies such as Endesa
have developed.
4.2.4 Case evidence on the impact of overlapping jurisdiction in elec-
tricity and gas mergers
The involvement of di¤erent levels of government in the same industry can
essentially be solved in three di¤erent ways: non-cooperation, cooperation or
overlapping (or concurrent) jurisdiction. The cases of non cooperation and co-
operation were presented in the telecommunications theoretical insights, and
the main ideas could be applied to electricity where relevant. In addition, there
is one particuar aspect of electricity on both sides of the Atlantic that strikes
as a clear example of overlapping jurisdiction, and this is merger policy, where
di¤erent agencies have de facto veto power.74 In the US, this is de facto and
74There is also overlapping jurisdiction in telecommunications merger policy, but there has
been less merger activity in telecommunications in Europe than in electricity, and therefore
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de jure, since legally both the state public utility commisions and FERC have
authority to stop a merger. In Europe, this is de facto: although the com-
petition conditions of the mergers are allocated according to a very clear rule
based on the turnover of the merging companies in several European compa-
nies, national regulators and governments can and do intervene if they can ar-
gue that the merger jeopardized the nancial capacity of regulated segments or
other national objectives. Some theoretical insights in electricity merger policy
were presented above. Four merger cases (two European, two North American)
involving di¤erent institutional characteristics in the vertical or horizontal di-
mension of government illustrate the likely consequences of overlapping merger
authority.
-Pacicorp and Utah Power & Light Company (Stalon and Lock, 1990,
p. 470). In 1988, seven state regulatory commissions and FERC were involved in
the approval of the merger between these two companies. The state commissions
granted approval before FERC acted on the proposal. A FERCs Administra-
tive Law Judge concluded initially that the proposed merger posed too great a
threat to competition to receive federal approval. The commission nevertheless
approved the merger subject to the stringent condition that the merged com-
pany would permit access to its transmission grid at cost-based prices. The
Utah Public Utility Commission expressed concerns that the FERC-imposed
conditions would damage the interests of Utahs ratepayers, but according to
Stalon and Lock (1990), "the company was able to persuade all the PUCs that
the benets of the merger would outweigh any detriments caused by the condi-
tions." These authors argue that "this case vividly illustrates the potential for
conict between FERCs regulatory objective of enhancing the e¢ ciency of the
wholesale bulk power markets and the more parochial objectives of state PUCs
in protecting the interests of retail ratepayers." In this particular case, without
the conditions, there was the risk that one of the merging companies used its
monopoly power over bottleneck transmission paths to gain for itself and its
ratepayers a portion of the rents associated with interstate power transactions.
In future transactions, other states also could exercise monopoly over transmis-
sion paths which would damage their neighboring states and reduce the overall
o¢ ciency of the wholesale power markets that benets all states in the long
term.
-PSEG and Exelon merger. This case is presented in Wolak (2007).
Three sets of agencies assessed the competitive impacts of the proposed merger:
the federal wholesale electricity regulator (FERC), the New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania state public utility commissions, and the United States Department
of Justice (DOJ). Note that although the merger took place in the territory of
the PJM Transmission Organization, the institutions of this organization did
not intervene in the merger review. Both the federal and state regulatory com-
missions are legally required to apply a "public interest" standard, which is
di¤erent from the standard applied in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, based
on whether the merger will create or enhance market power. The public interest
it is more di¢ cult to put together examples from both Europe and America.
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standard of FERC is based on the impact of the merger on competition, rates
and regulation. The public interest of the states is broader and includes the
impact on employment and the achievement of tangible or substantial benets
for consumers. Although the explicit focus in the analysis of this merger was on
the competition conditions in the wholesale markets, Wolak (2007) argues that
the public interest standard a¤ords high discretion to the regulatory agencies.
On July 1, 2005, FERC approved the merger with a divestiture package. The
next to act was the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, which approved
the merger in late January 2006 after the subsidiary in the state agreed not
to increase retail prices until 2010. It also agreed to spend $1.2 million on
additional consumer outreach to acquaint low-income consumers with discount
programs and to maintain its corporate headquarters in Philadelphia through
at least 2010. In June 2006, the DOJ approved the merger subject to addi-
tional divestitures. Negotiations between the parties and the New Jersey public
utility regulatory body NJBPU proceeded for almost three months after the
agreement with the DOJ was announced. The state commission was trying to
achieve rate reductions and further benets for their jurisdictions consumers.
In mid-September 2006 the parties withdrew their application for approval of
the merger at the NJBPU, which had been pending for more than 19 months.
Wolak (2007) argues that "the amount of the public benets settlement desired
by the NJBPU may have been su¢ ciently large relative to the other concessions
to cause the net benefts from the transaction to be non positive.
-Hidrocantábrico takeover battle.75 In 2000, EnBW, a German sub-
sidiary of the state owned French EDF, announced a takeover of Hidrocan-
tábrico, the fourth largest electricity rm in Spain, which has most of its assets
in the northern region of Asturias. The Spanish government reacted passing a
law forbidding any foreign state-owned rm from controlling an electricity com-
pany. This law would be subsequently rejected by the European institutions.
The Asturias regional government was more open to bargaining, and since the
beginning showed a predisposition to lobby for the takeover in exchange for
industrial and employment concessions. The takeover battle triggered by the
initial EDF o¤er ended four years later, in 2004, when the state-owned Electri-
cidade de Portugal, in partnership with a regional savings bank, Cajastur, made
a nal winning o¤er that was accepted by the shareholders of Hidrocantábrico,
committing the rm to keep its headquarters in Asturias and develop a number
of industrial development and employment programs.
-Endesa takeover battle. In September 2005 the Spanish Gas Natural
made an o¤er for Endesa that triggered a bitter economic and political debate
because a company based in Barcelona was tryieng to take over a company
based in the capital Madrid. The management team of Endesa defended its
position using political and economic strategies. In 2006, an o¤er by E.On
improved upon the one by Gas Natural, although it was also initially rejected
by the management team, and triggered a reaction by the Spanish government
trying to stop a surprise acquisition of control by foreign interests. This reaction
75This and the next case are presented in Trillas (2008).
52
included a discretional change in the rules of the elecricity regulatory agency
that allowed this agency to stop a merger appealing to reasons of security of
supply or national interest. In 2007, the battle nished with an Italian company,
ENEL, which had the Italian state as the main shareholder, gaining control of
the compay in partnership with a Spanish construction rm, apparently with
the agreement of the Spanish government.
In these cases, in most of the cases (the two American cases and the Endesa
case) the federal merger authority was more strictly concerned abut economic
e¢ ciency and the lower leve authorities (states, European member states or
regions), more concerned about other objectives, such as employment, national
ownership or industrial policy. It is clear that in all these cases the public
authorities not only act as regulators but also as agents involved in the ownership
of rms and in industrial policy. An interesting feature of the takeovers of
Hidrocantábrico and Endesa is that the regulatory game conditioned the nature
and identity of the rms that eventually resulted from the takeover battles. In
Hidrocantábrico, eventually the winning bidder was Electricidade de Portugal
in coalition with a regional savings bank (Cajastur) partially controlled by the
Asturias regional government. In the Endesa takeovers some years later, Enel of
Italy, with the Italian state as the largest bidder, won the contest against E.On
after forming a coalition with the Spanish construction company Acciona.
Following the taxonomy of Sah and Stiglitz (1986), when several agencies
have parallel decision making powers and have veto power, the architecture is
called a veto poliarchy. In this case, it can be shown, as the examples suggest,
that there is a risk that a disproportionate amount of Type I errors will occur:
some good mergers will not be authorized. There is then a trade o¤ between
the di¤erent expertise of several regulators (and possibly other attributes such
as better political participation, in the sense of Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997)
and delay or probability of mistakes. Mergers in regulated sectors have been
shown to take place in takeovers that take longer to be completed and that are
more costly than takeovers in other indusries.76 Wolak (2007) argues that "few
mergers involving generation unit owners in wholesale electricity markets will
be able to survive this multi-stage, federal and state antitrust and regulatory
approval process and still provide value to the shareholders of the merged com-
panies. The public benet standard applied by most public utility commissions
provides state governments with a substantial ability to extract nancial conces-
sions from the merging parties that may cause the merging paties to terminate
potentially benecial mergers." This raises the risk not only of e¢ cient mergers
not happening, but also of ine¢ cient rms winning in some takeover battles: if
winning takeover battles is costly and protracted, it will not be the rms that
are best at producing electricity that win, but rather the best at playing the
political game, or the ones able and willing to foot the bill of these protracted




In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications
and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical
structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-
state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the
commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate
the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest
group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and es-
pecialized77 and makes it di¢ cult for more interest groups to organize, it is not
clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with under-
investment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some
segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture
of regulation expand. Di¤erent segments in the value chain of network indus-
tries may require regulatory intervention with di¤erent geographic scopes. It is
very likely in this case that industry outcomes will depend on the interaction
between several regulators. This article has exlored the consequences of non
cooperation, cooperation and overlapping responsibilities.
One of the benets of decentralization is the possibility that under uncer-
tainty mistakes in a single jurisdiction do not contaminate a whole reform pack-
age and the other jurisdictions can learn from these mistakes. A clear example
is the asco in the deregulation of electricity in California in 2000. If the asco
had taken place in the whole US, the future of electricity liberalization in the
US and probably in other countries would have been much bleaker for a long
time.
Taking into account that liberalization of network industries has been dened
as a long and winding road and that there is little international consensus on
many dimensions (eg broadband di¤usion strategies), there is merit in leaving
di¤erent jurisdictions follow their own way. Given that for this or other reasons
(for instance legitimacy, political participation or subsidiarity, or because they
face strong pressure to do so) local jurisdictions will try to intervene in regu-
latory policies, the relevant policy question is not so much which government
level should regulate industries, but which should be the optimal form of par-
ticipation of each level of government in regulatory policies, taking into account
industry structure, technology, history and the constraints faced by each level of
government. The problem of lack of coordination is not unique of decentralized
agencies; "independent" national or federal agencies may su¤er from the same
problem. Bernstein (1955) mentions as one of the weaknesses of independent
agencies the lack of coordination with the general government. Aubert and Laf-
font (2002, p. 45) argue that "even if reallocation of powers is within sight, the
rst priority may be to improve the regulations themselves -to favor horizontal
or vertical cooperation of existing authorities- so that the ground is prepared
for politically acceptable institutional reforms."
The di¢ culties of drawing bright lines to separate jurisdictional boundaries
77Centralization of investigations and R&D are regarded in general as pure public goods.
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are illustrated by the following quote in the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion web page (visited on August 22, 2008):
Congress has preserved state commission jurisdiction over electric retail ser-
vice and distribution facilities while granting FERC jurisdiction over transmis-
sion service and wholesale electric markets. Because the transmission and whole-
sale market issues have signicant impacts upon the electric retail service and
rates regulated by the CPUC, it is critical that the CPUC be closely involved in
federal electric transmission rate and policy matters, as well as in design and
operation of the wholesale markets.
For the same reason, it is important for the CPUC to participate in the North
American Western regions transmission planning and coordination processes.
Consequently, the CPUC engages with regulatory agencies, organizations and
processes beyond Californias borders and jurisdiction.
Non central governments intervene in regulated industries not only as regula-
tors, but often as owners or as decision-makers in industrial policy. Paticipating
in targeting univeral service schemes and reducing costs of using rights of way
are promising tasks for local/regional governments even in a world of increasing
liberalization. They can be delegated tasks for which higher level administra-
tions do not want to be overwhelmed, and exercise these tasks with limited and
accountable discretion in a disciplined framework.
The analysis here ts uncomfortably with a tendency to build lists of in-
dustries to be allocated to each level of government. For example, Aubert and
La¤ont (2002), Brennan (2003) and Smith (2000) provide examples of such lists.
Typically, telecommunications networks are associated to the central level, to-
gether with electricity transmission and wholesale electricity markets, with dis-
tribution and retail electricity associated to the local or state level. As Woroch
(1990) argues "the relative magnitude of spillovers can be reduced by expand-
ing the size of jurisdictions. This reasoning argues for FCC control of all ac-
tivities that trascend state boundaries, such as equipment standards, spectrum
allocation, and satellite transmissions." At most, these lists should be general
guidelines as to the relative weight of each level of government in each industry
segment. However, central levels may provide an input to policies even where
there are few spillovers if there is a need for expertise, for information gathering
to be used in yardstick competition, or for common standards. Conversely, even
when externalities are signicant, local levels may practice "laboratory federal-
ism" or provide an input in the form of tayloring to local conditions and solving
collective action problems.
The relevant comparison in practice is often between independent centralized
regulation (or two-tier, with the regulator in an informing capacity) or non-
independent one-tier decentralized regulation (Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2006,
can be interpreted along these lines), because decentralized powers do not need
a regulator to improve information since they have enough information or beca-
sue they dont have access to experts so that they face labour market constraints
to set up an independent regulator, or because they have enough commitment
powers and do not need to strategically delegate. However, the relative im-
portance of independence varies depending on the location of the hyerarchical
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relationship; for example, one can argue that regulation is more independent at
the national than at the European level, but in some European countries more
independent at the national than at the regional level.
The federal level can ease the conict of policies at the state level. For ex-
ample, coordinating security of supply in energy policy at the continental level.
A broader analysis along these lines should also take into account the role for
global institutions: ITU, IEA, Internet governance organizations. The federal
level has also a role in market creation or market integration, as a prior ac-
tion before deciding whether to regulate the market or not. Creating a market
and deregulating it are di¤erent things. In telecoms, e¢ ciency would call for
the creation of large geographic competitive markets; in electricity, large geo-
graphic markets which need a regulated transmission segment, and some form of
intervention (such as regional transmission organizations in the US) that guar-
antees the coordination between wholesale markets and system operators. In
the US electricity, the attempts to create a role for federal regulation (for e¢ -
ciency reasons) preceded deregulation, although they largely failed. Then from
a normative point of view, the question arises of what is the optimal industry
structure and geographic scope for markets, in the Coasian sense of what are
the boundaries that minimize the transaction costs of operating with markets.
It would indeed promote European integration to be able to have pan-European
mobile phone networks (so that there would be only one common "national pre-
x," as the "1" shared by the US and Canada; and no roaming would be required
when crossing a border), or to be able to buy in any country the same satellite
TV platform with the possibility of subscribing to any channel in Europe.78 Or
to have a single pan-European telephone number system, not only for mobile,
but also for xed telephony. However, the Internet is probably reducing the rel-
ative gains that could be obtained with such initiatives, as one can for example
watch any video from You Tube today and will be able to watch any movie or
program probably soon just connecting to the Internet.
The introduction of competition at the federal level requires the development
of new instruments or other policy reforms (for example, on universal service or
security of supply) to satisfy the "other" policy objectives that local regulators
78Since the beginning of Satellite TV, it has been possible in Europe to buy a satellite
TV contract in one country, take the decoder to any other country, install a satellite dish
and watch the preferred national platform in this other country. Many nationals leaving in
other European countries just do that: when the author was a graduate and postgraduate
student in Italy and the UK he watched the same Spanish platform with the same decoder
(and now also has a British platform in Spain, which has to be paid in a bank account in the
UK, not being valid a bank account in a Spanish branch of a British bank); retired families
that reside one half of the year in Germany and another half in Spain do the same with their
German decoders; English and Irish pubs in the center of Barcelona o¤er the possibility of
watching sports events from their countries through British satellite platforms. The possibility
of watching foreign country platforms is not openly publicized (except for example in some
magazines for the English speaking community in Barcelona), which suggests that their legal
status is at least unclear. But the fact that these experiences exist, and that any distributor
knows about them and some indeed specialize in them, does suggest that it would be as easy to
have pan-European platforms with the possibility of watching (for a variety of fees) virtually
any channel, and that the only thing that stops it is the protection of jurisdictional turf.
56
used to satisfy with regulation or vertically integrated public ownership, when
these policy objectives are legitimate, or the clarication that some of these
other policy objectives are not legitimate (eg national champions). Otherwise,
the federal introduction of competition will hardly be feasible. In some cases,
the "second objective" will be legitimate in some aspects but not in others, eg
industrial policy or ght against ination or environmental objectives, which
makes the issue a complex one. For example, Joskow (2006, p. 29) argues that
"if policymakers are serious about competitive markets for power they will have
to rethink the long tradition of relying on taxation by regulation of the electric
power industry to implement policies in ways that hide the associated costs from
taxpayers."
6 Appendix 1
Data Set for Table 1:
Country GDPcap Urbanicity Centralization BBPerformance
Australia 31794 1120.216 0.556 10.53
Austria 33700 1857.749 0.579895739 9.37
Belgium 32119 1763.877 0.572796776 10.17
Canada 33375 1082.22 0.396627149 10.61
Czech Republic 20538 3167.285 0.730748194 7.03
Denmark 33973 2004.834 0.626465482 11.44
Finland 32153 1371.425 0.515214578 12.2
France 30386 1049.33 0.442635422 11.59
Germany 29461 2496.877 0.295654683 10.17
Greece 23381 3128.786 0.748200692 8.26
Hungary 17887 1541.127 0.649370233 8.22
Iceland 36510 2142.871 0.734093076 11.2
Ireland 38505 1601.817 0.807174538 9.01
Italy 28529 1676.603 0.565048938 9.54
Japan 31267 2892.295 0.458684848 15.05
Korea 22029 8905.785 0.689748769 15.92
Netherlands 32684 2408.095 0.582338077 11.77
New Zealand 24996 1638.184 0.89453147 9.68
Norway 41420 1821.501 0.788802829 11.05
Poland 13847 2381.409 0.573285703 7.83
Portugal 20410 1771.782 0.674991406 10.15
Spain 27169 3864.379 0.431537481 9.68
Sweden 32525 2647.032 0.555096123 11.53
Switzerland 35633 2480.904 0.341003551 10.78
United Kingdom 33238 3732.875 0.917159989 10.3
United States 41890 839.2261 0.575944033 10.25
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7 Appendix 2
Denitions and sources for variables used in Table 2.
-Penbb: Total number of broadband (DSL, Cable modem, Fibre to the home,
Satellite and others) subscribers per capita. Source: Point Topic Ltd. Global
Broadband Statistics (2000-2006).
-Intra: Herndhal index measuring the concentration of DSL rms (intra-
platform). Source: Point Topic Ltd. Global Broadband Statistics (2000-2006).
-Inter: Herndhal index measuring the competition across platforms (inter-
platform). Source: Point Topic Ltd. Global Broadband Statistics (2000-2006).
-Row1: Dichotomous variable taking the value 1 when rights of way and
digging permits over public land are granted by a single central authority and
0 when rights of way are granted by local authorities. Source: European
Union Reports on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory
Package (2000-2006).
-Row2: Dichotomous variable taking valuue 1 when operators experience
delays in getting rights of way or digging permits and 0 when no delays are
reported. Source: European Union Reports on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package (2000-2006).
-Llu: A variable that measures the price of an unbundled copper local loop.
As in Distaso (2006), it is obtained by adding one third of the one-o¤ charge
to the monthly fee. Source: European Union Reports on the Implementation of
the Telecommunications Regulatory Package (2000-2006)
-Llp: A variable that measures the prices of a leased line. It is obtained by
adding the one-o¤ fee to the annual charge of 2km of 2 Mbps leased line. Source:
European Union Reports on the Implementation of the Telecommunications
Regulatory Package (2000-2006)
-Full unbundling: Dichotomous variable taking value 1 when full LLU is
mandated (0 otherwise). Source: OECD (2003). Developments in Local Loop
Unbundling.
-Bitstream: Dichotomous variable taking value 1 when bitstream access is
mandated (0 otherwise). Source: OECD (2003). Developments in Local Loop
Unbundling.
-Subloop: Dichotomous variable taking value 1 when subloop unbundling is
mandated (0 otherwise). Source: OECD (2003). Developments in Local Loop
Unbundling.
-Co-mingling: Dichotomous variable taking value 1 when co-mingling collo-
cation is implemented (0 otherwise). Source: OECD (2003). Developments in
Local Loop Unbundling.
-Remote: Dichotomous variable taking value 1 when remote collocation is
implemented (0 otherwise). Source: OECD (2003). Developments in Local
Loop Unbundling.
-Virtual: Dichotomous variable taking value 1 when virtual collocation is
implemented (0 otherwise). Source: OECD (2003). Developments in Local
Loop Unbundling.
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-GDP per capita: Gross domestic product at current market prices divided
by population. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2000-2006)
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